Latest reviewed change
source content difference between and
Verified drained total rose from 1,366.5774 to 1,405.0671 BTC and verified drained addresses from 4,580 to 4,925. The site also renamed itself from Coldcard Sweep Watch to Coldcard Watch and split its view filter into Verified, Attested and Suspected.
-Coldcard Sweep Watch
+Coldcard Watch
DashboardAddress listMethodology
live
Bitcoin Drained from Coldcards
-1,366.5774BTC
+1,405.0671BTC
$71,048,000at $62,949 per bitcoin
First lines only. The complete diff is in the timeline below.
- Organisation
- community tracker
- Evidence role
- Chain monitor
- Published
- continuously updated
- Source changes
- 10
- Detected differences
- 10
- Unreviewed
- 0
- Copies held
- 11
The tracker expanded on 1 Aug from the first 1,195-address episode to two episodes totalling 2,321 addresses and 1,128.4717 BTC. It includes a browser-local address checker and follows spends from the consolidation addresses hop by hop. It labels the first episode 29 July without stating a timezone; the corresponding on-chain window begins 30 July at 01:10 UTC. Operator anonymous; figures cross-check against Galaxy's published map for the first episode. The original host, coldcard-watch.vercel.app, stopped resolving at 21:43 UTC on 3 Aug 2026; the same tracker (identical page, headline and last-drain figures) was found serving at coldcardwatch.com on 4 Aug 2026 and the registry URL moved with it.
Every check is recorded, including checks that found no text change. A detected edit is therefore bounded between two checks. The publisher's exact save time is not observable from this record. Last checked .
This post is held twice: here, with this project's own note on why it matters, and again as part of the conversation captured at , which is polled for changes. Both copies are the same post; neither is a separate event.
Snapshot and diff bodies for this chain monitor are held in the local evidence archive but withheld from the public site because they can contain the addresses of people who published nothing themselves. Capture times and reviewed change summaries remain available below.
Held captures
-
Verified drained total rose from 1,366.5774 to 1,405.0671 BTC and verified drained addresses from 4,580 to 4,925. The site also renamed itself from Coldcard Sweep Watch to Coldcard Watch and split its view filter into Verified, Attested and Suspected.
Recovered from the Internet Archive rather than captured by this project. The row records that third-party provenance separately from captures made by this project.
What changed from the previous capture 16 lines
-Coldcard Sweep Watch +Coldcard Watch DashboardAddress listMethodology live Bitcoin Drained from Coldcards -1,366.5774BTC +1,405.0671BTC $71,048,000at $62,949 per bitcoin Left of this line is the drain window on 30 and 31 July. Right of it is real time since. The two halves are drawn at different scales, so the drains stay visible against days of holding. +BTC +block +mined +addresses drained +view block 0d 00h 00m 00suntouched for 275blocks mined since 960,466chain tip View: -Confirmed -Potential +Verified +Attested +Suspected These are verified minimums, not totals. Every figure here comes from clusters that have been identified and checked transaction by transaction. Other attackers are working the same flaw with their own patterns, and undiscovered clusters are near certain. Treat this as a floor. 0.00993644BTC taken from bc1qelcnp9m9qh5r2su986d8kdkmdc9grlsujc8uuv 31 July 2026, 08:36:17 UTCblock 960,369view transaction -4,580 +4,925 addresses drained, verified view the full list The last address drained, on 31 July. 237 other addresses were drained in the same block. How many people that adds up to is not knowable from the chain, since one wallet can hold many addresses.Extracted text as captured
Coldcard Watch DashboardAddress listMethodology live Bitcoin Drained from Coldcards 1,405.0671BTC $71,048,000at $62,949 per bitcoin Left of this line is the drain window on 30 and 31 July. Right of it is real time since. The two halves are drawn at different scales, so the drains stay visible against days of holding. BTC block mined addresses drained view block 0d 00h 00m 00suntouched for 275blocks mined since 960,466chain tip View: Verified Attested Suspected These are verified minimums, not totals. Every figure here comes from clusters that have been identified and checked transaction by transaction. Other attackers are working the same flaw with their own patterns, and undiscovered clusters are near certain. Treat this as a floor. How these addresses were identified Is an address in the set? Every address confirmed drained is published in full on the address list. Open it and filter that public list to see whether an address appears. These are on-chain addresses anyone can verify on a block explorer; this page has no form and collects nothing. Never type a seed phrase, private key, or passphrase into any website. No legitimate tool asks for one. Most recent drain 0.00993644BTC taken from bc1qelcnp9m9qh5r2su986d8kdkmdc9grlsujc8uuv 31 July 2026, 08:36:17 UTCblock 960,369view transaction 4,925 addresses drained, verified view the full list The last address drained, on 31 July. 237 other addresses were drained in the same block. How many people that adds up to is not knowable from the chain, since one wallet can hold many addresses. Where the money is The six addresses the drains paid into. Nothing has left them. Coins have moved. The rows below now include the addresses they went to. Balances refresh every 60 seconds and stream over a websocket in between. If any tracked address spends, this page reads where the coins went and starts tracking those addresses too, following the trail one hop at a time. The headline figure only ever counts coins traced back to the theft, so a destination wallet holding other funds cannot inflate it. Is your Coldcard affected? Seeds generated on the firmware below were built with far less randomness than intended. Find your model and compare against the version you generated your seed on.Excerpt only. The complete copy is held offline and backs quotations on this site. The original publication remains the canonical public source.
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First capture at the new coldcardwatch.com domain after the vercel.app host stopped resolving. The tracker replaced its browser-local address-checker form with a published full address list ('Is an address in the set? ... this page has no form and collects nothing') and changed its footer to 'Independent security research'. The headline figure is unchanged at 1,366.5774 BTC across 4,580 addresses.
Recovered from the Internet Archive rather than captured by this project. The row records that third-party provenance separately from captures made by this project.
What changed from the previous capture 10 lines
have been identified and checked transaction by transaction. Other attackers are working the same flaw with their own patterns, and undiscovered clusters are near certain. Treat this as a floor. How these addresses were identified -Was your address drained? -Paste a public bitcoin address to check it against the 4,580 addresses confirmed drained so far. The check runs entirely inside your browser against a hashed list. Nothing is sent anywhere and nothing is logged. -Check -The set covers three clusters: 1,195 addresses on 30 July (blocks 960183 to 960191), 1,126 on 31 July (blocks 960345 to 960369), and 13 more later that day (block 960455). The first window fell on the evening of Wednesday 29 July in US time zones, which is why some accounts date the theft to the 29th. -Never type a seed phrase, private key, or passphrase into this page or any other. No legitimate tool asks for one. +Is an address in the set? +Every address confirmed drained is published in full on the address list. Open it and filter that public list to see whether an address appears. These are on-chain addresses anyone can verify on a block explorer; this page has no form and collects nothing. +Never type a seed phrase, private key, or passphrase into any website. No legitimate tool asks for one. Most recent drain 0.00993644BTC taken from bc1qelcnp9m9qh5r2su986d8kdkmdc9grlsujc8uuv Updating the firmware does not repair a seed that already exists. If your seed was generated on an affected version, the fix is to move your funds to a newly generated wallet. Two things reduce the risk. Coinkite say 50 to 98 of your own private dice rolls contributed at least 128 bits on their own, and 99 or more about 256 bits; below 50, or if you cannot remember, they say migrate. A strong BIP-39 passphrase reduces the immediate exposure but does not repair the seed, so passphrase users are told to migrate as well. On fixed firmware dice rolls are optional and the device seed is enough. Their advisory is the authority on what to do, not this page. Balances stream from mempool.space and Blockstream Esplora. Incident detail from the Coinkite advisory and Block's engineering analysis. -Not affiliated with Coinkite. If you hold a Coldcard, follow the vendor advisory and move to a new seed rather than relying on anything here. +Independent security research. Not affiliated with Coinkite or Coldcard. If you hold a Coldcard, follow the vendor advisory and move to a new seed rather than relying on anything here.Extracted text as captured
Coldcard Sweep Watch DashboardAddress listMethodology live Bitcoin Drained from Coldcards 1,366.5774BTC $71,048,000at $62,949 per bitcoin Left of this line is the drain window on 30 and 31 July. Right of it is real time since. The two halves are drawn at different scales, so the drains stay visible against days of holding. 0d 00h 00m 00suntouched for 275blocks mined since 960,466chain tip View: Confirmed Potential These are verified minimums, not totals. Every figure here comes from clusters that have been identified and checked transaction by transaction. Other attackers are working the same flaw with their own patterns, and undiscovered clusters are near certain. Treat this as a floor. How these addresses were identified Is an address in the set? Every address confirmed drained is published in full on the address list. Open it and filter that public list to see whether an address appears. These are on-chain addresses anyone can verify on a block explorer; this page has no form and collects nothing. Never type a seed phrase, private key, or passphrase into any website. No legitimate tool asks for one. Most recent drain 0.00993644BTC taken from bc1qelcnp9m9qh5r2su986d8kdkmdc9grlsujc8uuv 31 July 2026, 08:36:17 UTCblock 960,369view transaction 4,580 addresses drained, verified view the full list The last address drained, on 31 July. 237 other addresses were drained in the same block. How many people that adds up to is not knowable from the chain, since one wallet can hold many addresses. Where the money is The six addresses the drains paid into. Nothing has left them. Coins have moved. The rows below now include the addresses they went to. Balances refresh every 60 seconds and stream over a websocket in between. If any tracked address spends, this page reads where the coins went and starts tracking those addresses too, following the trail one hop at a time. The headline figure only ever counts coins traced back to the theft, so a destination wallet holding other funds cannot inflate it. Is your Coldcard affected? Seeds generated on the firmware below were built with far less randomness than intended. Find your model and compare against the version you generated your seed on. Two details here go further than Coinkite’s advisory, both checked against their own signed release manifest. Their advisory bounds the Mk3 at 4.1.9, but signed Mk3 builds 5.0.1 and 5.0.3 shipped in 2022, after the change that caused this, and Coinkite has not said whether those are affected; they are listed as at risk because that is the safer reading. Block traces the fault to a 4.0.0 tag, but no 4.0.0 firmware was ever distributed, so 4.0.1 is the first version anyone could have generated a seed on. Coinkite emailed affected customers directly, and said so publicly on 2 August so people could tell a real message from a fake one. Treat any email, DM or call about this that asks for a seed phrase as an attack. Nobody legitimate needs it, and an incident like this draws people who will ask. Updating the firmware does not repair a seed that already exists. If your seed was generated on an affected version, the fix is to move your funds to a newly generated wallet. Two things reduce the risk. Coinkite say 50 to 98 of your own private dice rolls contributed at least 128 bits on their own, and 99 or more about 256 bits; below 50, or if you cannot remember, they say migrate. A strong BIP-39 passphrase reduces the immediate exposure but does not repair the seed, so passphrase users are told to migrate as well. On fixed firmware dice rolls are optional and the device seed is enough. Their advisory is the authority on what to do, not this page. Balances stream from mempool.space and Blockstream Esplora. Incident detail from the Coinkite advisory and Block's engineering analysis. Independent security research. Not affiliated with Coinkite or Coldcard. If you hold a Coldcard, follow the vendor advisory and move to a new seed rather than relying on anything here.Excerpt only. The complete copy is held offline and backs quotations on this site. The original publication remains the canonical public source.
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Added a View switcher with Confirmed and Potential options above the verified-minimums disclaimer, so the tracker now separates confirmed clusters from potential ones. The headline figures and disclaimer text were unchanged.
Recovered from the Internet Archive rather than captured by this project. The row records that third-party provenance separately from captures made by this project.
What changed from the previous capture 3 lines
0d 00h 00m 00suntouched for 275blocks mined since 960,466chain tip +View: +Confirmed +Potential These are verified minimums, not totals. Every figure here comes from clusters that have been identified and checked transaction by transaction. Other attackers are working the same flaw with their own patterns, and undiscovered clusters are near certain. Treat this as a floor.Extracted text as captured
Coldcard Sweep Watch DashboardAddress listMethodology live Bitcoin Drained from Coldcards 1,366.5774BTC $71,048,000at $62,949 per bitcoin Left of this line is the drain window on 30 and 31 July. Right of it is real time since. The two halves are drawn at different scales, so the drains stay visible against days of holding. 0d 00h 00m 00suntouched for 275blocks mined since 960,466chain tip View: Confirmed Potential These are verified minimums, not totals. Every figure here comes from clusters that have been identified and checked transaction by transaction. Other attackers are working the same flaw with their own patterns, and undiscovered clusters are near certain. Treat this as a floor. How these addresses were identified Was your address drained? Paste a public bitcoin address to check it against the 4,580 addresses confirmed drained so far. The check runs entirely inside your browser against a hashed list. Nothing is sent anywhere and nothing is logged. Check The set covers three clusters: 1,195 addresses on 30 July (blocks 960183 to 960191), 1,126 on 31 July (blocks 960345 to 960369), and 13 more later that day (block 960455). The first window fell on the evening of Wednesday 29 July in US time zones, which is why some accounts date the theft to the 29th. Never type a seed phrase, private key, or passphrase into this page or any other. No legitimate tool asks for one. Most recent drain 0.00993644BTC taken from bc1qelcnp9m9qh5r2su986d8kdkmdc9grlsujc8uuv 31 July 2026, 08:36:17 UTCblock 960,369view transaction 4,580 addresses drained, verified view the full list The last address drained, on 31 July. 237 other addresses were drained in the same block. How many people that adds up to is not knowable from the chain, since one wallet can hold many addresses. Where the money is The six addresses the drains paid into. Nothing has left them. Coins have moved. The rows below now include the addresses they went to. Balances refresh every 60 seconds and stream over a websocket in between. If any tracked address spends, this page reads where the coins went and starts tracking those addresses too, following the trail one hop at a time. The headline figure only ever counts coins traced back to the theft, so a destination wallet holding other funds cannot inflate it. Is your Coldcard affected? Seeds generated on the firmware below were built with far less randomness than intended. Find your model and compare against the version you generated your seed on. Two details here go further than Coinkite’s advisory, both checked against their own signed release manifest. Their advisory bounds the Mk3 at 4.1.9, but signed Mk3 builds 5.0.1 and 5.0.3 shipped in 2022, after the change that caused this, and Coinkite has not said whether those are affected; they are listed as at risk because that is the safer reading. Block traces the fault to a 4.0.0 tag, but no 4.0.0 firmware was ever distributed, so 4.0.1 is the first version anyone could have generated a seed on. Coinkite emailed affected customers directly, and said so publicly on 2 August so people could tell a real message from a fake one. Treat any email, DM or call about this that asks for a seed phrase as an attack. Nobody legitimate needs it, and an incident like this draws people who will ask. Updating the firmware does not repair a seed that already exists. If your seed was generated on an affected version, the fix is to move your funds to a newly generated wallet. Two things reduce the risk. Coinkite say 50 to 98 of your own private dice rolls contributed at least 128 bits on their own, and 99 or more about 256 bits; below 50, or if you cannot remember, they say migrate. A strong BIP-39 passphrase reduces the immediate exposure but does not repair the seed, so passphrase users are told to migrate as well. On fixed firmware dice rolls are optional and the device seed is enough. Their advisory is the authority on what to do, not this page.Excerpt only. The complete copy is held offline and backs quotations on this site. The original publication remains the canonical public source.
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The tracker's headline moved from 1,359.1829 BTC across 4,312 verified addresses to 1,366.5774 BTC across 4,580, and its address-check copy changed with it. The cluster description of three windows on 30 and 31 July was unchanged.
Recovered from the Internet Archive rather than captured by this project. The row records that third-party provenance separately from captures made by this project.
What changed from the previous capture 6 lines
DashboardAddress listMethodology live Bitcoin Drained from Coldcards -1,359.1829BTC +1,366.5774BTC $71,048,000at $62,949 per bitcoin Left of this line is the drain window on 30 and 31 July. Right of it is real time since. The two halves are drawn at different scales, so the drains stay visible against days of holding. 0d 00h 00m 00suntouched for flaw with their own patterns, and undiscovered clusters are near certain. Treat this as a floor. How these addresses were identified Was your address drained? -Paste a public bitcoin address to check it against the 4,312 addresses confirmed drained so far. The check runs entirely inside your browser against a hashed list. Nothing is sent anywhere and nothing is logged. +Paste a public bitcoin address to check it against the 4,580 addresses confirmed drained so far. The check runs entirely inside your browser against a hashed list. Nothing is sent anywhere and nothing is logged. Check The set covers three clusters: 1,195 addresses on 30 July (blocks 960183 to 960191), 1,126 on 31 July (blocks 960345 to 960369), and 13 more later that day (block 960455). The first window fell on the evening of Wednesday 29 July in US time zones, which is why some accounts date the theft to the 29th. Never type a seed phrase, private key, or passphrase into this page or any other. No legitimate tool asks for one. 0.00993644BTC taken from bc1qelcnp9m9qh5r2su986d8kdkmdc9grlsujc8uuv 31 July 2026, 08:36:17 UTCblock 960,369view transaction -4,312 +4,580 addresses drained, verified view the full list The last address drained, on 31 July. 237 other addresses were drained in the same block. How many people that adds up to is not knowable from the chain, since one wallet can hold many addresses.Extracted text as captured
Coldcard Sweep Watch DashboardAddress listMethodology live Bitcoin Drained from Coldcards 1,366.5774BTC $71,048,000at $62,949 per bitcoin Left of this line is the drain window on 30 and 31 July. Right of it is real time since. The two halves are drawn at different scales, so the drains stay visible against days of holding. 0d 00h 00m 00suntouched for 275blocks mined since 960,466chain tip These are verified minimums, not totals. Every figure here comes from clusters that have been identified and checked transaction by transaction. Other attackers are working the same flaw with their own patterns, and undiscovered clusters are near certain. Treat this as a floor. How these addresses were identified Was your address drained? Paste a public bitcoin address to check it against the 4,580 addresses confirmed drained so far. The check runs entirely inside your browser against a hashed list. Nothing is sent anywhere and nothing is logged. Check The set covers three clusters: 1,195 addresses on 30 July (blocks 960183 to 960191), 1,126 on 31 July (blocks 960345 to 960369), and 13 more later that day (block 960455). The first window fell on the evening of Wednesday 29 July in US time zones, which is why some accounts date the theft to the 29th. Never type a seed phrase, private key, or passphrase into this page or any other. No legitimate tool asks for one. Most recent drain 0.00993644BTC taken from bc1qelcnp9m9qh5r2su986d8kdkmdc9grlsujc8uuv 31 July 2026, 08:36:17 UTCblock 960,369view transaction 4,580 addresses drained, verified view the full list The last address drained, on 31 July. 237 other addresses were drained in the same block. How many people that adds up to is not knowable from the chain, since one wallet can hold many addresses. Where the money is The six addresses the drains paid into. Nothing has left them. Coins have moved. The rows below now include the addresses they went to. Balances refresh every 60 seconds and stream over a websocket in between. If any tracked address spends, this page reads where the coins went and starts tracking those addresses too, following the trail one hop at a time. The headline figure only ever counts coins traced back to the theft, so a destination wallet holding other funds cannot inflate it. Is your Coldcard affected? Seeds generated on the firmware below were built with far less randomness than intended. Find your model and compare against the version you generated your seed on. Two details here go further than Coinkite’s advisory, both checked against their own signed release manifest. Their advisory bounds the Mk3 at 4.1.9, but signed Mk3 builds 5.0.1 and 5.0.3 shipped in 2022, after the change that caused this, and Coinkite has not said whether those are affected; they are listed as at risk because that is the safer reading. Block traces the fault to a 4.0.0 tag, but no 4.0.0 firmware was ever distributed, so 4.0.1 is the first version anyone could have generated a seed on. Coinkite emailed affected customers directly, and said so publicly on 2 August so people could tell a real message from a fake one. Treat any email, DM or call about this that asks for a seed phrase as an attack. Nobody legitimate needs it, and an incident like this draws people who will ask. Updating the firmware does not repair a seed that already exists. If your seed was generated on an affected version, the fix is to move your funds to a newly generated wallet. Two things reduce the risk. Coinkite say 50 to 98 of your own private dice rolls contributed at least 128 bits on their own, and 99 or more about 256 bits; below 50, or if you cannot remember, they say migrate. A strong BIP-39 passphrase reduces the immediate exposure but does not repair the seed, so passphrase users are told to migrate as well. On fixed firmware dice rolls are optional and the device seed is enough. Their advisory is the authority on what to do, not this page. Balances stream from mempool.space and Blockstream Esplora. Incident detail from the Coinkite advisory and Block's engineering analysis. Not affiliated with Coinkite. If you hold a Coldcard, follow the vendor advisory and move to a new seed rather than relying on anything here.Excerpt only. The complete copy is held offline and backs quotations on this site. The original publication remains the canonical public source.
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The tracker rewrote its affected-firmware notes, saying signed Mk3 builds 5.0.1 and 5.0.3 shipped after the change that caused the fault and are listed as at risk, and that 4.0.1 is the first distributed vulnerable version. It added that Coinkite emailed affected customers on 2 August with a phishing warning, and expanded the dice-roll and passphrase guidance with Coinkite's bit-strength figures.
Recovered from the Internet Archive rather than captured by this project. The row records that third-party provenance separately from captures made by this project.
What changed from the previous capture 6 lines
Balances refresh every 60 seconds and stream over a websocket in between. If any tracked address spends, this page reads where the coins went and starts tracking those addresses too, following the trail one hop at a time. The headline figure only ever counts coins traced back to the theft, so a destination wallet holding other funds cannot inflate it. Is your Coldcard affected? Seeds generated on the firmware below were built with far less randomness than intended. Find your model and compare against the version you generated your seed on. -Coinkite\u2019s advisory covers the Mk3 and newer. The Mk2 entry comes from Block\u2019s engineering analysis, which found the same vulnerable path and no secure reseed on that model, and no patched firmware for it has been published. Coinkite dates the Mk3 exposure from 4.0.1 while Block traces it to 4.0.0; the wider range is shown here. -\n +Two details here go further than Coinkite’s advisory, both checked against their own signed release manifest. Their advisory bounds the Mk3 at 4.1.9, but signed Mk3 builds 5.0.1 and 5.0.3 shipped in 2022, after the change that caused this, and Coinkite has not said whether those are affected; they are listed as at risk because that is the safer reading. Block traces the fault to a 4.0.0 tag, but no 4.0.0 firmware was ever distributed, so 4.0.1 is the first version anyone could have generated a seed on. +Coinkite emailed affected customers directly, and said so publicly on 2 August so people could tell a real message from a fake one. Treat any email, DM or call about this that asks for a seed phrase as an attack. Nobody legitimate needs it, and an incident like this draws people who will ask. Updating the firmware does not repair a seed that already exists. If your seed was generated on an affected version, the fix is to move your funds to a newly generated wallet. -Two things reduce the risk: adding 50 or more of your own dice rolls during seed generation, and a strong BIP-39 passphrase. Coinkite still recommends migrating. Their advisory is the authority on what to do, not this page. +Two things reduce the risk. Coinkite say 50 to 98 of your own private dice rolls contributed at least 128 bits on their own, and 99 or more about 256 bits; below 50, or if you cannot remember, they say migrate. A strong BIP-39 passphrase reduces the immediate exposure but does not repair the seed, so passphrase users are told to migrate as well. On fixed firmware dice rolls are optional and the device seed is enough. Their advisory is the authority on what to do, not this page. Balances stream from mempool.space and Blockstream Esplora. Incident detail from the Coinkite advisory and Block's engineering analysis. Not affiliated with Coinkite. If you hold a Coldcard, follow the vendor advisory and move to a new seed rather than relying on anything here.Extracted text as captured
Coldcard Sweep Watch DashboardAddress listMethodology live Bitcoin Drained from Coldcards 1,359.1829BTC $71,048,000at $62,949 per bitcoin Left of this line is the drain window on 30 and 31 July. Right of it is real time since. The two halves are drawn at different scales, so the drains stay visible against days of holding. 0d 00h 00m 00suntouched for 275blocks mined since 960,466chain tip These are verified minimums, not totals. Every figure here comes from clusters that have been identified and checked transaction by transaction. Other attackers are working the same flaw with their own patterns, and undiscovered clusters are near certain. Treat this as a floor. How these addresses were identified Was your address drained? Paste a public bitcoin address to check it against the 4,312 addresses confirmed drained so far. The check runs entirely inside your browser against a hashed list. Nothing is sent anywhere and nothing is logged. Check The set covers three clusters: 1,195 addresses on 30 July (blocks 960183 to 960191), 1,126 on 31 July (blocks 960345 to 960369), and 13 more later that day (block 960455). The first window fell on the evening of Wednesday 29 July in US time zones, which is why some accounts date the theft to the 29th. Never type a seed phrase, private key, or passphrase into this page or any other. No legitimate tool asks for one. Most recent drain 0.00993644BTC taken from bc1qelcnp9m9qh5r2su986d8kdkmdc9grlsujc8uuv 31 July 2026, 08:36:17 UTCblock 960,369view transaction 4,312 addresses drained, verified view the full list The last address drained, on 31 July. 237 other addresses were drained in the same block. How many people that adds up to is not knowable from the chain, since one wallet can hold many addresses. Where the money is The six addresses the drains paid into. Nothing has left them. Coins have moved. The rows below now include the addresses they went to. Balances refresh every 60 seconds and stream over a websocket in between. If any tracked address spends, this page reads where the coins went and starts tracking those addresses too, following the trail one hop at a time. The headline figure only ever counts coins traced back to the theft, so a destination wallet holding other funds cannot inflate it. Is your Coldcard affected? Seeds generated on the firmware below were built with far less randomness than intended. Find your model and compare against the version you generated your seed on. Two details here go further than Coinkite’s advisory, both checked against their own signed release manifest. Their advisory bounds the Mk3 at 4.1.9, but signed Mk3 builds 5.0.1 and 5.0.3 shipped in 2022, after the change that caused this, and Coinkite has not said whether those are affected; they are listed as at risk because that is the safer reading. Block traces the fault to a 4.0.0 tag, but no 4.0.0 firmware was ever distributed, so 4.0.1 is the first version anyone could have generated a seed on. Coinkite emailed affected customers directly, and said so publicly on 2 August so people could tell a real message from a fake one. Treat any email, DM or call about this that asks for a seed phrase as an attack. Nobody legitimate needs it, and an incident like this draws people who will ask. Updating the firmware does not repair a seed that already exists. If your seed was generated on an affected version, the fix is to move your funds to a newly generated wallet. Two things reduce the risk. Coinkite say 50 to 98 of your own private dice rolls contributed at least 128 bits on their own, and 99 or more about 256 bits; below 50, or if you cannot remember, they say migrate. A strong BIP-39 passphrase reduces the immediate exposure but does not repair the seed, so passphrase users are told to migrate as well. On fixed firmware dice rolls are optional and the device seed is enough. Their advisory is the authority on what to do, not this page. Balances stream from mempool.space and Blockstream Esplora. Incident detail from the Coinkite advisory and Block's engineering analysis. Not affiliated with Coinkite. If you hold a Coldcard, follow the vendor advisory and move to a new seed rather than relying on anything here.Excerpt only. The complete copy is held offline and backs quotations on this site. The original publication remains the canonical public source.
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The tracker's headline moved from 1,158.8480 BTC across 2,686 verified addresses to 1,359.1829 BTC across 4,312, and its address-check copy changed with it. The cluster description of three windows on 30 and 31 July was unchanged.
Recovered from the Internet Archive rather than captured by this project. The row records that third-party provenance separately from captures made by this project.
What changed from the previous capture 6 lines
DashboardAddress listMethodology live Bitcoin Drained from Coldcards -1,158.8480BTC +1,359.1829BTC $71,048,000at $62,949 per bitcoin Left of this line is the drain window on 30 and 31 July. Right of it is real time since. The two halves are drawn at different scales, so the drains stay visible against days of holding. 0d 00h 00m 00suntouched for flaw with their own patterns, and undiscovered clusters are near certain. Treat this as a floor. How these addresses were identified Was your address drained? -Paste a public bitcoin address to check it against the 2,686 addresses confirmed drained so far. The check runs entirely inside your browser against a hashed list. Nothing is sent anywhere and nothing is logged. +Paste a public bitcoin address to check it against the 4,312 addresses confirmed drained so far. The check runs entirely inside your browser against a hashed list. Nothing is sent anywhere and nothing is logged. Check The set covers three clusters: 1,195 addresses on 30 July (blocks 960183 to 960191), 1,126 on 31 July (blocks 960345 to 960369), and 13 more later that day (block 960455). The first window fell on the evening of Wednesday 29 July in US time zones, which is why some accounts date the theft to the 29th. Never type a seed phrase, private key, or passphrase into this page or any other. No legitimate tool asks for one. 0.00993644BTC taken from bc1qelcnp9m9qh5r2su986d8kdkmdc9grlsujc8uuv 31 July 2026, 08:36:17 UTCblock 960,369view transaction -2,686 +4,312 addresses drained, verified view the full list The last address drained, on 31 July. 237 other addresses were drained in the same block. How many people that adds up to is not knowable from the chain, since one wallet can hold many addresses.Extracted text as captured
Coldcard Sweep Watch DashboardAddress listMethodology live Bitcoin Drained from Coldcards 1,359.1829BTC $71,048,000at $62,949 per bitcoin Left of this line is the drain window on 30 and 31 July. Right of it is real time since. The two halves are drawn at different scales, so the drains stay visible against days of holding. 0d 00h 00m 00suntouched for 275blocks mined since 960,466chain tip These are verified minimums, not totals. Every figure here comes from clusters that have been identified and checked transaction by transaction. Other attackers are working the same flaw with their own patterns, and undiscovered clusters are near certain. Treat this as a floor. How these addresses were identified Was your address drained? Paste a public bitcoin address to check it against the 4,312 addresses confirmed drained so far. The check runs entirely inside your browser against a hashed list. Nothing is sent anywhere and nothing is logged. Check The set covers three clusters: 1,195 addresses on 30 July (blocks 960183 to 960191), 1,126 on 31 July (blocks 960345 to 960369), and 13 more later that day (block 960455). The first window fell on the evening of Wednesday 29 July in US time zones, which is why some accounts date the theft to the 29th. Never type a seed phrase, private key, or passphrase into this page or any other. No legitimate tool asks for one. Most recent drain 0.00993644BTC taken from bc1qelcnp9m9qh5r2su986d8kdkmdc9grlsujc8uuv 31 July 2026, 08:36:17 UTCblock 960,369view transaction 4,312 addresses drained, verified view the full list The last address drained, on 31 July. 237 other addresses were drained in the same block. How many people that adds up to is not knowable from the chain, since one wallet can hold many addresses. Where the money is The six addresses the drains paid into. Nothing has left them. Coins have moved. The rows below now include the addresses they went to. Balances refresh every 60 seconds and stream over a websocket in between. If any tracked address spends, this page reads where the coins went and starts tracking those addresses too, following the trail one hop at a time. The headline figure only ever counts coins traced back to the theft, so a destination wallet holding other funds cannot inflate it. Is your Coldcard affected? Seeds generated on the firmware below were built with far less randomness than intended. Find your model and compare against the version you generated your seed on. Coinkite\u2019s advisory covers the Mk3 and newer. The Mk2 entry comes from Block\u2019s engineering analysis, which found the same vulnerable path and no secure reseed on that model, and no patched firmware for it has been published. Coinkite dates the Mk3 exposure from 4.0.1 while Block traces it to 4.0.0; the wider range is shown here. \n Updating the firmware does not repair a seed that already exists. If your seed was generated on an affected version, the fix is to move your funds to a newly generated wallet. Two things reduce the risk: adding 50 or more of your own dice rolls during seed generation, and a strong BIP-39 passphrase. Coinkite still recommends migrating. Their advisory is the authority on what to do, not this page. Balances stream from mempool.space and Blockstream Esplora. Incident detail from the Coinkite advisory and Block's engineering analysis. Not affiliated with Coinkite. If you hold a Coldcard, follow the vendor advisory and move to a new seed rather than relying on anything here.Excerpt only. The complete copy is held offline and backs quotations on this site. The original publication remains the canonical public source.
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The tracker's headline moved from 1,128.6633 BTC across 2,334 verified addresses to 1,158.8480 BTC across 2,686, and its address-check copy changed with it. The cluster description of three windows on 30 and 31 July was unchanged.
Recovered from the Internet Archive rather than captured by this project. The row records that third-party provenance separately from captures made by this project.
What changed from the previous capture 6 lines
DashboardAddress listMethodology live Bitcoin Drained from Coldcards -1,128.6633BTC +1,158.8480BTC $71,048,000at $62,949 per bitcoin Left of this line is the drain window on 30 and 31 July. Right of it is real time since. The two halves are drawn at different scales, so the drains stay visible against days of holding. 0d 00h 00m 00suntouched for flaw with their own patterns, and undiscovered clusters are near certain. Treat this as a floor. How these addresses were identified Was your address drained? -Paste a public bitcoin address to check it against the 2,334 addresses confirmed drained so far. The check runs entirely inside your browser against a hashed list. Nothing is sent anywhere and nothing is logged. +Paste a public bitcoin address to check it against the 2,686 addresses confirmed drained so far. The check runs entirely inside your browser against a hashed list. Nothing is sent anywhere and nothing is logged. Check The set covers three clusters: 1,195 addresses on 30 July (blocks 960183 to 960191), 1,126 on 31 July (blocks 960345 to 960369), and 13 more later that day (block 960455). The first window fell on the evening of Wednesday 29 July in US time zones, which is why some accounts date the theft to the 29th. Never type a seed phrase, private key, or passphrase into this page or any other. No legitimate tool asks for one. 0.00993644BTC taken from bc1qelcnp9m9qh5r2su986d8kdkmdc9grlsujc8uuv 31 July 2026, 08:36:17 UTCblock 960,369view transaction -2,334 +2,686 addresses drained, verified view the full list The last address drained, on 31 July. 237 other addresses were drained in the same block. How many people that adds up to is not knowable from the chain, since one wallet can hold many addresses.Extracted text as captured
Coldcard Sweep Watch DashboardAddress listMethodology live Bitcoin Drained from Coldcards 1,158.8480BTC $71,048,000at $62,949 per bitcoin Left of this line is the drain window on 30 and 31 July. Right of it is real time since. The two halves are drawn at different scales, so the drains stay visible against days of holding. 0d 00h 00m 00suntouched for 275blocks mined since 960,466chain tip These are verified minimums, not totals. Every figure here comes from clusters that have been identified and checked transaction by transaction. Other attackers are working the same flaw with their own patterns, and undiscovered clusters are near certain. Treat this as a floor. How these addresses were identified Was your address drained? Paste a public bitcoin address to check it against the 2,686 addresses confirmed drained so far. The check runs entirely inside your browser against a hashed list. Nothing is sent anywhere and nothing is logged. Check The set covers three clusters: 1,195 addresses on 30 July (blocks 960183 to 960191), 1,126 on 31 July (blocks 960345 to 960369), and 13 more later that day (block 960455). The first window fell on the evening of Wednesday 29 July in US time zones, which is why some accounts date the theft to the 29th. Never type a seed phrase, private key, or passphrase into this page or any other. No legitimate tool asks for one. Most recent drain 0.00993644BTC taken from bc1qelcnp9m9qh5r2su986d8kdkmdc9grlsujc8uuv 31 July 2026, 08:36:17 UTCblock 960,369view transaction 2,686 addresses drained, verified view the full list The last address drained, on 31 July. 237 other addresses were drained in the same block. How many people that adds up to is not knowable from the chain, since one wallet can hold many addresses. Where the money is The six addresses the drains paid into. Nothing has left them. Coins have moved. The rows below now include the addresses they went to. Balances refresh every 60 seconds and stream over a websocket in between. If any tracked address spends, this page reads where the coins went and starts tracking those addresses too, following the trail one hop at a time. The headline figure only ever counts coins traced back to the theft, so a destination wallet holding other funds cannot inflate it. Is your Coldcard affected? Seeds generated on the firmware below were built with far less randomness than intended. Find your model and compare against the version you generated your seed on. Coinkite\u2019s advisory covers the Mk3 and newer. The Mk2 entry comes from Block\u2019s engineering analysis, which found the same vulnerable path and no secure reseed on that model, and no patched firmware for it has been published. Coinkite dates the Mk3 exposure from 4.0.1 while Block traces it to 4.0.0; the wider range is shown here. \n Updating the firmware does not repair a seed that already exists. If your seed was generated on an affected version, the fix is to move your funds to a newly generated wallet. Two things reduce the risk: adding 50 or more of your own dice rolls during seed generation, and a strong BIP-39 passphrase. Coinkite still recommends migrating. Their advisory is the authority on what to do, not this page. Balances stream from mempool.space and Blockstream Esplora. Incident detail from the Coinkite advisory and Block's engineering analysis. Not affiliated with Coinkite. If you hold a Coldcard, follow the vendor advisory and move to a new seed rather than relying on anything here.Excerpt only. The complete copy is held offline and backs quotations on this site. The original publication remains the canonical public source.
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The tracker moved from two episodes to three clusters by adding 13 addresses in block 960455, changed the destination set from four addresses to six, revised the same-block count for the last drained address from 250 to 237, and added an explanatory note about the two-scale timeline.
Recovered from the Internet Archive rather than captured by this project. The row records that third-party provenance separately from captures made by this project.
What changed from the previous capture 7 lines
Bitcoin Drained from Coldcards 1,128.6633BTC $71,048,000at $62,949 per bitcoin +Left of this line is the drain window on 30 and 31 July. Right of it is real time since. The two halves are drawn at different scales, so the drains stay visible against days of holding. 0d 00h 00m 00suntouched for 275blocks mined since 960,466chain tip Was your address drained? Paste a public bitcoin address to check it against the 2,334 addresses confirmed drained so far. The check runs entirely inside your browser against a hashed list. Nothing is sent anywhere and nothing is logged. Check -The set covers both episodes: 1,195 addresses on 30 July (blocks 960183 to 960191) and a further 1,126 on 31 July (blocks 960345 to 960369). The first window fell on the evening of Wednesday 29 July in US time zones, which is why some accounts date the theft to the 29th. +The set covers three clusters: 1,195 addresses on 30 July (blocks 960183 to 960191), 1,126 on 31 July (blocks 960345 to 960369), and 13 more later that day (block 960455). The first window fell on the evening of Wednesday 29 July in US time zones, which is why some accounts date the theft to the 29th. Never type a seed phrase, private key, or passphrase into this page or any other. No legitimate tool asks for one. Most recent drain 0.00993644BTC 2,334 addresses drained, verified view the full list -The last address drained, in a second episode on 31 July. 250 others fell in the same block. How many people that adds up to is not knowable from the chain, since one wallet can hold many addresses. +The last address drained, on 31 July. 237 other addresses were drained in the same block. How many people that adds up to is not knowable from the chain, since one wallet can hold many addresses. Where the money is -The four addresses the sweep paid into. Nothing has left them. +The six addresses the drains paid into. Nothing has left them. Coins have moved. The rows below now include the addresses they went to. Balances refresh every 60 seconds and stream over a websocket in between. If any tracked address spends, this page reads where the coins went and starts tracking those addresses too, following the trail one hop at a time. The headline figure only ever counts coins traced back to the theft, so a destination wallet holding other funds cannot inflate it. Is your Coldcard affected?Extracted text as captured
Coldcard Sweep Watch DashboardAddress listMethodology live Bitcoin Drained from Coldcards 1,128.6633BTC $71,048,000at $62,949 per bitcoin Left of this line is the drain window on 30 and 31 July. Right of it is real time since. The two halves are drawn at different scales, so the drains stay visible against days of holding. 0d 00h 00m 00suntouched for 275blocks mined since 960,466chain tip These are verified minimums, not totals. Every figure here comes from clusters that have been identified and checked transaction by transaction. Other attackers are working the same flaw with their own patterns, and undiscovered clusters are near certain. Treat this as a floor. How these addresses were identified Was your address drained? Paste a public bitcoin address to check it against the 2,334 addresses confirmed drained so far. The check runs entirely inside your browser against a hashed list. Nothing is sent anywhere and nothing is logged. Check The set covers three clusters: 1,195 addresses on 30 July (blocks 960183 to 960191), 1,126 on 31 July (blocks 960345 to 960369), and 13 more later that day (block 960455). The first window fell on the evening of Wednesday 29 July in US time zones, which is why some accounts date the theft to the 29th. Never type a seed phrase, private key, or passphrase into this page or any other. No legitimate tool asks for one. Most recent drain 0.00993644BTC taken from bc1qelcnp9m9qh5r2su986d8kdkmdc9grlsujc8uuv 31 July 2026, 08:36:17 UTCblock 960,369view transaction 2,334 addresses drained, verified view the full list The last address drained, on 31 July. 237 other addresses were drained in the same block. How many people that adds up to is not knowable from the chain, since one wallet can hold many addresses. Where the money is The six addresses the drains paid into. Nothing has left them. Coins have moved. The rows below now include the addresses they went to. Balances refresh every 60 seconds and stream over a websocket in between. If any tracked address spends, this page reads where the coins went and starts tracking those addresses too, following the trail one hop at a time. The headline figure only ever counts coins traced back to the theft, so a destination wallet holding other funds cannot inflate it. Is your Coldcard affected? Seeds generated on the firmware below were built with far less randomness than intended. Find your model and compare against the version you generated your seed on. Coinkite\u2019s advisory covers the Mk3 and newer. The Mk2 entry comes from Block\u2019s engineering analysis, which found the same vulnerable path and no secure reseed on that model, and no patched firmware for it has been published. Coinkite dates the Mk3 exposure from 4.0.1 while Block traces it to 4.0.0; the wider range is shown here. \n Updating the firmware does not repair a seed that already exists. If your seed was generated on an affected version, the fix is to move your funds to a newly generated wallet. Two things reduce the risk: adding 50 or more of your own dice rolls during seed generation, and a strong BIP-39 passphrase. Coinkite still recommends migrating. Their advisory is the authority on what to do, not this page. Balances stream from mempool.space and Blockstream Esplora. Incident detail from the Coinkite advisory and Block's engineering analysis. Not affiliated with Coinkite. If you hold a Coldcard, follow the vendor advisory and move to a new seed rather than relying on anything here.Excerpt only. The complete copy is held offline and backs quotations on this site. The original publication remains the canonical public source.
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The tracker added dashboard, address-list and methodology navigation, described its figures as verified minimums and a floor rather than totals, and changed its checkable address set from 2,321 to 2,334.
Recovered from the Internet Archive rather than captured by this project. The row records that third-party provenance separately from captures made by this project.
What changed from the previous capture 17 lines
Coldcard Sweep Watch -connecting +DashboardAddress listMethodology +live Bitcoin Drained from Coldcards -1,128.4717BTC -$71,036,000at $62,949 per bitcoin +1,128.6633BTC +$71,048,000at $62,949 per bitcoin 0d 00h 00m 00suntouched for 275blocks mined since 960,466chain tip +These are verified minimums, not totals. Every figure here comes from clusters that +have been identified and checked transaction by transaction. Other attackers are working the same +flaw with their own patterns, and undiscovered clusters are near certain. Treat this as a floor. +How these addresses were identified Was your address drained? -Paste a public bitcoin address to check it against the 2,321 addresses drained across both episodes. The check runs entirely inside your browser against a hashed list. Nothing is sent anywhere and nothing is logged. +Paste a public bitcoin address to check it against the 2,334 addresses confirmed drained so far. The check runs entirely inside your browser against a hashed list. Nothing is sent anywhere and nothing is logged. Check The set covers both episodes: 1,195 addresses on 30 July (blocks 960183 to 960191) and a further 1,126 on 31 July (blocks 960345 to 960369). The first window fell on the evening of Wednesday 29 July in US time zones, which is why some accounts date the theft to the 29th. Never type a seed phrase, private key, or passphrase into this page or any other. No legitimate tool asks for one. 0.00993644BTC taken from bc1qelcnp9m9qh5r2su986d8kdkmdc9grlsujc8uuv 31 July 2026, 08:36:17 UTCblock 960,369view transaction -2,321 -total addresses drained +2,334 +addresses drained, verified view the full list The last address drained, in a second episode on 31 July. 250 others fell in the same block. How many people that adds up to is not knowable from the chain, since one wallet can hold many addresses. Where the money isExtracted text as captured
Coldcard Sweep Watch DashboardAddress listMethodology live Bitcoin Drained from Coldcards 1,128.6633BTC $71,048,000at $62,949 per bitcoin 0d 00h 00m 00suntouched for 275blocks mined since 960,466chain tip These are verified minimums, not totals. Every figure here comes from clusters that have been identified and checked transaction by transaction. Other attackers are working the same flaw with their own patterns, and undiscovered clusters are near certain. Treat this as a floor. How these addresses were identified Was your address drained? Paste a public bitcoin address to check it against the 2,334 addresses confirmed drained so far. The check runs entirely inside your browser against a hashed list. Nothing is sent anywhere and nothing is logged. Check The set covers both episodes: 1,195 addresses on 30 July (blocks 960183 to 960191) and a further 1,126 on 31 July (blocks 960345 to 960369). The first window fell on the evening of Wednesday 29 July in US time zones, which is why some accounts date the theft to the 29th. Never type a seed phrase, private key, or passphrase into this page or any other. No legitimate tool asks for one. Most recent drain 0.00993644BTC taken from bc1qelcnp9m9qh5r2su986d8kdkmdc9grlsujc8uuv 31 July 2026, 08:36:17 UTCblock 960,369view transaction 2,334 addresses drained, verified view the full list The last address drained, in a second episode on 31 July. 250 others fell in the same block. How many people that adds up to is not knowable from the chain, since one wallet can hold many addresses. Where the money is The four addresses the sweep paid into. Nothing has left them. Coins have moved. The rows below now include the addresses they went to. Balances refresh every 60 seconds and stream over a websocket in between. If any tracked address spends, this page reads where the coins went and starts tracking those addresses too, following the trail one hop at a time. The headline figure only ever counts coins traced back to the theft, so a destination wallet holding other funds cannot inflate it. Is your Coldcard affected? Seeds generated on the firmware below were built with far less randomness than intended. Find your model and compare against the version you generated your seed on. Coinkite\u2019s advisory covers the Mk3 and newer. The Mk2 entry comes from Block\u2019s engineering analysis, which found the same vulnerable path and no secure reseed on that model, and no patched firmware for it has been published. Coinkite dates the Mk3 exposure from 4.0.1 while Block traces it to 4.0.0; the wider range is shown here. \n Updating the firmware does not repair a seed that already exists. If your seed was generated on an affected version, the fix is to move your funds to a newly generated wallet. Two things reduce the risk: adding 50 or more of your own dice rolls during seed generation, and a strong BIP-39 passphrase. Coinkite still recommends migrating. Their advisory is the authority on what to do, not this page. Balances stream from mempool.space and Blockstream Esplora. Incident detail from the Coinkite advisory and Block's engineering analysis. Not affiliated with Coinkite. If you hold a Coldcard, follow the vendor advisory and move to a new seed rather than relying on anything here.Excerpt only. The complete copy is held offline and backs quotations on this site. The original publication remains the canonical public source.
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The tracker expanded from the first 1,195-address episode to two episodes totalling 2,321 addresses and changed its headline from 1,082.5696 BTC to 1,128.4717 BTC.
Recovered from the Internet Archive rather than captured by this project. The row records that third-party provenance separately from captures made by this project.
What changed from the previous capture 18 lines
Coldcard Sweep Watch connecting Bitcoin Drained from Coldcards -1,082.5696BTC -$68,146,000at $62,949 per bitcoin +1,128.4717BTC +$71,036,000at $62,949 per bitcoin 0d 00h 00m 00suntouched for 275blocks mined since 960,466chain tip Was your address drained? -Paste a public bitcoin address to check it against the 1,195 addresses drained in this sweep. The check runs entirely inside your browser against a hashed list. Nothing is sent anywhere and nothing is logged. +Paste a public bitcoin address to check it against the 2,321 addresses drained across both episodes. The check runs entirely inside your browser against a hashed list. Nothing is sent anywhere and nothing is logged. Check -The set covers every address drained between 01:10:20 and 01:51:26 UTC on 30 July 2026, blocks 960183 to 960191. In US time zones that window fell on the evening of Wednesday 29 July, which is why some accounts date the theft to the 29th. No drains outside that window have been published, and the four addresses below have taken in nothing since. +The set covers both episodes: 1,195 addresses on 30 July (blocks 960183 to 960191) and a further 1,126 on 31 July (blocks 960345 to 960369). The first window fell on the evening of Wednesday 29 July in US time zones, which is why some accounts date the theft to the 29th. Never type a seed phrase, private key, or passphrase into this page or any other. No legitimate tool asks for one. Most recent drain -0.15694687BTC -taken from bc1qysdng7zm6sqwqjgjmyg8880mvlw56tkaw65gw4 -30 July 2026, 01:51:26 UTCblock 960,191view transaction -1,195 +0.00993644BTC +taken from bc1qelcnp9m9qh5r2su986d8kdkmdc9grlsujc8uuv +31 July 2026, 08:36:17 UTCblock 960,369view transaction +2,321 total addresses drained view the full list -The last address drained in the sweep. 158 others were drained in the same block. How many people that adds up to is not knowable from the chain, since one wallet can hold many addresses. +The last address drained, in a second episode on 31 July. 250 others fell in the same block. How many people that adds up to is not knowable from the chain, since one wallet can hold many addresses. Where the money is The four addresses the sweep paid into. Nothing has left them. Coins have moved. The rows below now include the addresses they went to.Extracted text as captured
Coldcard Sweep Watch connecting Bitcoin Drained from Coldcards 1,128.4717BTC $71,036,000at $62,949 per bitcoin 0d 00h 00m 00suntouched for 275blocks mined since 960,466chain tip Was your address drained? Paste a public bitcoin address to check it against the 2,321 addresses drained across both episodes. The check runs entirely inside your browser against a hashed list. Nothing is sent anywhere and nothing is logged. Check The set covers both episodes: 1,195 addresses on 30 July (blocks 960183 to 960191) and a further 1,126 on 31 July (blocks 960345 to 960369). The first window fell on the evening of Wednesday 29 July in US time zones, which is why some accounts date the theft to the 29th. Never type a seed phrase, private key, or passphrase into this page or any other. No legitimate tool asks for one. Most recent drain 0.00993644BTC taken from bc1qelcnp9m9qh5r2su986d8kdkmdc9grlsujc8uuv 31 July 2026, 08:36:17 UTCblock 960,369view transaction 2,321 total addresses drained view the full list The last address drained, in a second episode on 31 July. 250 others fell in the same block. How many people that adds up to is not knowable from the chain, since one wallet can hold many addresses. Where the money is The four addresses the sweep paid into. Nothing has left them. Coins have moved. The rows below now include the addresses they went to. Balances refresh every 60 seconds and stream over a websocket in between. If any tracked address spends, this page reads where the coins went and starts tracking those addresses too, following the trail one hop at a time. The headline figure only ever counts coins traced back to the theft, so a destination wallet holding other funds cannot inflate it. Is your Coldcard affected? Seeds generated on the firmware below were built with far less randomness than intended. Find your model and compare against the version you generated your seed on. Coinkite\u2019s advisory covers the Mk3 and newer. The Mk2 entry comes from Block\u2019s engineering analysis, which found the same vulnerable path and no secure reseed on that model, and no patched firmware for it has been published. Coinkite dates the Mk3 exposure from 4.0.1 while Block traces it to 4.0.0; the wider range is shown here. \n Updating the firmware does not repair a seed that already exists. If your seed was generated on an affected version, the fix is to move your funds to a newly generated wallet. Two things reduce the risk: adding 50 or more of your own dice rolls during seed generation, and a strong BIP-39 passphrase. Coinkite still recommends migrating. Their advisory is the authority on what to do, not this page. Balances stream from mempool.space and Blockstream Esplora. Incident detail from the Coinkite advisory and Block's engineering analysis. Not affiliated with Coinkite. If you hold a Coldcard, follow the vendor advisory and move to a new seed rather than relying on anything here.Excerpt only. The complete copy is held offline and backs quotations on this site. The original publication remains the canonical public source.
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Recovered from the Internet Archive rather than captured by this project. The row records that third-party provenance separately from captures made by this project.
What changed from the previous capture 0 lines
Extracted text as captured
Coldcard Sweep Watch connecting Bitcoin Drained from Coldcards 1,082.5696BTC $68,146,000at $62,949 per bitcoin 0d 00h 00m 00suntouched for 275blocks mined since 960,466chain tip Was your address drained? Paste a public bitcoin address to check it against the 1,195 addresses drained in this sweep. The check runs entirely inside your browser against a hashed list. Nothing is sent anywhere and nothing is logged. Check The set covers every address drained between 01:10:20 and 01:51:26 UTC on 30 July 2026, blocks 960183 to 960191. In US time zones that window fell on the evening of Wednesday 29 July, which is why some accounts date the theft to the 29th. No drains outside that window have been published, and the four addresses below have taken in nothing since. Never type a seed phrase, private key, or passphrase into this page or any other. No legitimate tool asks for one. Most recent drain 0.15694687BTC taken from bc1qysdng7zm6sqwqjgjmyg8880mvlw56tkaw65gw4 30 July 2026, 01:51:26 UTCblock 960,191view transaction 1,195 total addresses drained view the full list The last address drained in the sweep. 158 others were drained in the same block. How many people that adds up to is not knowable from the chain, since one wallet can hold many addresses. Where the money is The four addresses the sweep paid into. Nothing has left them. Coins have moved. The rows below now include the addresses they went to. Balances refresh every 60 seconds and stream over a websocket in between. If any tracked address spends, this page reads where the coins went and starts tracking those addresses too, following the trail one hop at a time. The headline figure only ever counts coins traced back to the theft, so a destination wallet holding other funds cannot inflate it. Is your Coldcard affected? Seeds generated on the firmware below were built with far less randomness than intended. Find your model and compare against the version you generated your seed on. Coinkite\u2019s advisory covers the Mk3 and newer. The Mk2 entry comes from Block\u2019s engineering analysis, which found the same vulnerable path and no secure reseed on that model, and no patched firmware for it has been published. Coinkite dates the Mk3 exposure from 4.0.1 while Block traces it to 4.0.0; the wider range is shown here. \n Updating the firmware does not repair a seed that already exists. If your seed was generated on an affected version, the fix is to move your funds to a newly generated wallet. Two things reduce the risk: adding 50 or more of your own dice rolls during seed generation, and a strong BIP-39 passphrase. Coinkite still recommends migrating. Their advisory is the authority on what to do, not this page. Balances stream from mempool.space and Blockstream Esplora. Incident detail from the Coinkite advisory and Block's engineering analysis. Not affiliated with Coinkite. If you hold a Coldcard, follow the vendor advisory and move to a new seed rather than relying on anything here.Excerpt only. The complete copy is held offline and backs quotations on this site. The original publication remains the canonical public source.
0 presentation-noise differences. Sidebar, ticker and other page chrome churn that our review classified as not being changes to what the source says.
The excerpts and plain unified diffs above show the text this project held and how it changed. To verify a quotation, compare it against the page itself or against the Internet Archive's copies, which are independent of this project.
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