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Debian Security Advisory DSA-1571-1

debian-openssl-dsa-1571

https://lists.debian.org/debian-security-announce/2008/msg00152.html

Organisation
Debian
Evidence role
Vendor advisory
Published
2008-05-13
Source changes
0
Detected differences
0
Unreviewed
0
Copies held
1

Primary Debian advisory for CVE-2008-0166, including the affected release period and instruction to regenerate cryptographic key material.

Every check is recorded, including checks that found no text change. A detected edit is therefore bounded between two checks. The publisher's exact save time is not observable from this record. Last checked .

  1. Earliest copy held Current
    seen · Captured here 15,342 chars
    Extracted text as captured
    [Date Prev][Date Next] [Thread Prev][Thread Next] [Date Index] [Thread Index]
    [SECURITY] [DSA 1571-1] New openssl packages fix predictable random number generator
    To: [email protected]
    Subject: [SECURITY] [DSA 1571-1] New openssl packages fix predictable random number generator
    From: Florian Weimer <[email protected]>
    Date: Tue, 13 May 2008 14:06:39 +0200
    Message-id: <[馃攷]聽[email protected]>
    Reply-to: [email protected]
    -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
    Hash: SHA1
    
    - ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Debian Security Advisory DSA-1571-1                  [email protected]
    http://www.debian.org/security/                           Florian Weimer
    May 13, 2008                          http://www.debian.org/security/faq
    - ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
    Package        : openssl
    Vulnerability  : predictable random number generator
    Problem type   : remote
    Debian-specific: yes
    CVE Id(s)      : CVE-2008-0166
    
    Luciano Bello discovered that the random number generator in Debian's
    openssl package is predictable.  This is caused by an incorrect
    Debian-specific change to the openssl package (CVE-2008-0166).  As a
    result, cryptographic key material may be guessable.
    
    This is a Debian-specific vulnerability which does not affect other
    operating systems which are not based on Debian.  However, other systems
    can be indirectly affected if weak keys are imported into them.
    
    It is strongly recommended that all cryptographic key material which has
    been generated by OpenSSL versions starting with 0.9.8c-1 on Debian
    systems is recreated from scratch.  Furthermore, all DSA keys ever used
    on affected Debian systems for signing or authentication purposes should
    be considered compromised; the Digital Signature Algorithm relies on a
    secret random value used during signature generation.
    
    The first vulnerable version, 0.9.8c-1, was uploaded to the unstable

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