r/Bitcoin: comparison of major hardware wallets after the entropy bug
reddit-hardware-wallet-comparison
https://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/1vehzv8/i_compared_every_major_bitcoin_hardware_wallet/
Latest reviewed change
source content difference between and
Two previously removed comments were restored under a named account, asking about SeedSigner and physical dice for seed generation.
comment: p1s5h3x
parent: t1_p1m1dou
-author: [deleted]
+author: Miserable_Hope_3073
created_utc: 1785898840
edited: false
body:
First lines only. The complete diff is in the timeline below.
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Every check is recorded, including checks that found no text change. A detected edit is therefore bounded between two checks. The publisher's exact save time is not observable from this record. Last checked .
Also held inside a captured conversation
This post is held twice: here, with this project's own note on why it matters, and again as part of the conversation captured at , which is polled for changes. Both copies are the same post; neither is a separate event.
Public privacy boundary
Snapshot and diff bodies for this chain monitor are held in the local evidence archive but withheld from the public site because they can contain the addresses of people who published nothing themselves. Capture times and reviewed change summaries remain available below.
Held captures
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Two previously removed comments were restored under a named account, asking about SeedSigner and physical dice for seed generation.
Recovered from the Internet Archive rather than captured by this project. The row records that third-party provenance separately from captures made by this project.
What changed from the previous capture 8 lines
comment: p1s5h3x parent: t1_p1m1dou -author: [deleted] +author: Miserable_Hope_3073 created_utc: 1785898840 edited: false body: -[removed] +can you also check seed signer please? It seems great since its air gapped and made of decentralized components. comment: p1snthe parent: t1_p1s5h3x comment: p1ss2h5 parent: t1_p1snthe -author: [deleted] +author: Miserable_Hope_3073 created_utc: 1785907865 edited: false body: -[removed] +Thanks! I will try to understand how entropy and the code-based dice/coin works before getting into crypto. But it seems like this is one of the better wallets. Do you think using physical casino dice is best? comment: p1su9wx parent: t1_p1ss2h5Extracted text as captured
post: 1vehzv8 author: [deleted] created_utc: 1785773802 title: I compared every major Bitcoin hardware wallet after the Coldcard entropy bug body: [deleted] comment: p1kb4ny parent: t3_1vehzv8 author: AnarchyCheesemonger created_utc: 1785806476 edited: false body: In the case of Tangem you can choose to use a seed phrase. In that case your seed is generated by your phone. “a) In the Android app, we use SecureRandom (used as new SecureRandom(), no algorithm string, no setSeed()), a CSPRNG whose output goes through BoringSSL/Conscrypt to the kernel entropy pool, seeded from interrupt timing, sensors, and the SoC’s hardware TRNG. This means an attacker who sees any amount of output still can’t predict or reconstruct your key material. b) In the iOS app, we use the system-provided SecRandomCopyBytes API, which generates cryptographically secure random bytes suitable for cryptographic key generation. The entropy is sourced, among other things, from the Secure Enclave’s hardware-based true random number generator (TRNG). The security of this approach has been validated through an independent security audit.” comment: p1kdwbv parent: t3_1vehzv8 author: Keefryan created_utc: 1785807395 edited: false body: Thank You. Very helpful. comment: p1kh82v parent: t3_1vehzv8 author: ElGuano created_utc: 1785808497 edited: false body: Nice! How did you conclude Trezor is the strongest design, compared to the other multi-source mixing strategies? comment: p1kid55 parent: t3_1vehzv8 author: k_gavivina created_utc: 1785808876 edited: false body:Excerpt only. The complete copy is held offline and backs quotations on this site. The original publication remains the canonical public source.
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Two SeedSigner comments, including discussion of dice-derived entropy, were removed and replaced with deleted-account placeholders.
Recovered from the Internet Archive rather than captured by this project. The row records that third-party provenance separately from captures made by this project.
What changed from the previous capture 8 lines
comment: p1s5h3x parent: t1_p1m1dou -author: Miserable_Hope_3073 +author: [deleted] created_utc: 1785898840 edited: false body: -can you also check seed signer please? It seems great since its air gapped and made of decentralized components. +[removed] comment: p1snthe parent: t1_p1s5h3x comment: p1ss2h5 parent: t1_p1snthe -author: Miserable_Hope_3073 +author: [deleted] created_utc: 1785907865 edited: false body: -Thanks! I will try to understand how entropy and the code-based dice/coin works before getting into crypto. But it seems like this is one of the better wallets. Do you think using physical casino dice is best? +[removed] comment: p1su9wx parent: t1_p1ss2h5Extracted text as captured
post: 1vehzv8 author: [deleted] created_utc: 1785773802 title: I compared every major Bitcoin hardware wallet after the Coldcard entropy bug body: [deleted] comment: p1kb4ny parent: t3_1vehzv8 author: AnarchyCheesemonger created_utc: 1785806476 edited: false body: In the case of Tangem you can choose to use a seed phrase. In that case your seed is generated by your phone. “a) In the Android app, we use SecureRandom (used as new SecureRandom(), no algorithm string, no setSeed()), a CSPRNG whose output goes through BoringSSL/Conscrypt to the kernel entropy pool, seeded from interrupt timing, sensors, and the SoC’s hardware TRNG. This means an attacker who sees any amount of output still can’t predict or reconstruct your key material. b) In the iOS app, we use the system-provided SecRandomCopyBytes API, which generates cryptographically secure random bytes suitable for cryptographic key generation. The entropy is sourced, among other things, from the Secure Enclave’s hardware-based true random number generator (TRNG). The security of this approach has been validated through an independent security audit.” comment: p1kdwbv parent: t3_1vehzv8 author: Keefryan created_utc: 1785807395 edited: false body: Thank You. Very helpful. comment: p1kh82v parent: t3_1vehzv8 author: ElGuano created_utc: 1785808497 edited: false body: Nice! How did you conclude Trezor is the strongest design, compared to the other multi-source mixing strategies? comment: p1kid55 parent: t3_1vehzv8 author: k_gavivina created_utc: 1785808876 edited: false body:Excerpt only. The complete copy is held offline and backs quotations on this site. The original publication remains the canonical public source.
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Several comments were removed or replaced with deleted-account placeholders, including criticism of wallet alternatives, secure elements and open-source licensing; one short request for a destination was also removed.
Recovered from the Internet Archive rather than captured by this project. The row records that third-party provenance separately from captures made by this project.
What changed from the previous capture 60 lines
comment: p1l2hip parent: t1_p1kh82v -author: OldHamburger7923 +author: [deleted] created_utc: 1785816125 edited: false body: -No, not nice. Coldcard would look fine on this list. They have enough entropy in their hardware. They just disabled it. The same thing can happen to any of the wallets listed here. - -There is nothing preventing the developers of a wallet from being dumbasses. The existence of hardware doesn't mean it is enabled or must be used in the workflow exposed to users. - -Open source means you can look but it doesn't mean it's bug free. Closed source means you have to trust them. - -Open source with closed source hardware libraries for their rng means you can't tell if there is a backdoor in the logic or if its enabled or not. They can do a function override and not call it. +[deleted] comment: p1l56aa parent: t1_p1l2hip comment: p1ld39l parent: t1_p1lb90a -author: OldHamburger7923 +author: [deleted] created_utc: 1785820618 edited: false body: -You could say the same thing for coldcard, that their code is fantastic, its fully open source, etc, etc. - -The issue we are discussing is apparently alternatives to coldcard based on features, and if you are going to compare them to coldcard, none of the features listed would prevent a similar move of commenting out the hardware and giving you a crap seed. - -It's even worse with ledger because we can't check the software interactions with the secure element, its not open source. - -and lets not forget the selling point of the secure element safeguarding the seed - which we later find out doesn't prevent export of the seed. And oh yes, now it can export your seed to the cloud. that just increases attack surfaces and didn't need to be there. +[deleted] comment: p1ld3ih parent: t1_p1lb90a edited: false body: Bitbox is the best 😁 - -comment: p1lfbrl -parent: t1_p1ldaw7 -author: OldHamburger7923 -created_utc: 1785821655 -edited: false -body: -In the context of today's debate, we can't verify that in any firmware published, that the secure element is actually used. We also can't know that the seeds generated don't have a backdoor as we have zero insight into the process. - -You are right - I haven't seen anything to indicate that ledgers seed's have low entropy, but we would have said the same about coldcard last week. It's good till it isn't. All we can do is take precautions. comment: p1lh1gu parent: t3_1vehzv8 comment: p1lzydz parent: t1_p1lnngn -author: OldHamburger7923 +author: [deleted] created_utc: 1785831662 edited: false body: -Don't we have the exact commit when the exploit was introduced? +[deleted] comment: p1m0kyf parent: t1_p1lzydz comment: p1m2o01 parent: t1_p1m0kyf -author: OldHamburger7923 +author: [deleted] created_utc: 1785833025 -edited: 1785853763 -body: -So doesn't that mean we see the associated code and this this isn't closed source with hidden logic? - -Edit: people on reddit think if it isn't gpl it isn't open source. Open source doesn't require gpl. +edited: 1785918563 +body: +[deleted] comment: p1m3b5t parent: t1_p1klmu6 comment: p1njgd5 parent: t1_p1n92xm -author: OldHamburger7923 +author: [deleted] created_utc: 1785852509 edited: false body: -You should look it up. Open source means you can see the source. - -Open source licencing takes many forms. GPL is just one of many. It can be open source without you being able to take it and use it commercially for yourself. - -I swear, the people on reddit get dumber every day. +[deleted] comment: p1nkwnb parent: t3_1vehzv8 Reduce reliance on panics in security-sensitive paths and prefer explicit error handling. Without dynamic analysis or review of dependent components (especially SyncCell, bitbox\_aes, the secure-chip interface, and the memory abstraction), I don't see a clear cryptographic break or authentication bypass in the provided code. -comment: p1qclnn -parent: t1_p1mz2qc -author: 12ealdeal -created_utc: 1785878499 -edited: false -body: -To where? - comment: p1qnahr parent: t1_p1ma7x4 author: WebPlenty2337Extracted text as captured
post: 1vehzv8 author: [deleted] created_utc: 1785773802 title: I compared every major Bitcoin hardware wallet after the Coldcard entropy bug body: [deleted] comment: p1kb4ny parent: t3_1vehzv8 author: AnarchyCheesemonger created_utc: 1785806476 edited: false body: In the case of Tangem you can choose to use a seed phrase. In that case your seed is generated by your phone. “a) In the Android app, we use SecureRandom (used as new SecureRandom(), no algorithm string, no setSeed()), a CSPRNG whose output goes through BoringSSL/Conscrypt to the kernel entropy pool, seeded from interrupt timing, sensors, and the SoC’s hardware TRNG. This means an attacker who sees any amount of output still can’t predict or reconstruct your key material. b) In the iOS app, we use the system-provided SecRandomCopyBytes API, which generates cryptographically secure random bytes suitable for cryptographic key generation. The entropy is sourced, among other things, from the Secure Enclave’s hardware-based true random number generator (TRNG). The security of this approach has been validated through an independent security audit.” comment: p1kdwbv parent: t3_1vehzv8 author: Keefryan created_utc: 1785807395 edited: false body: Thank You. Very helpful. comment: p1kh82v parent: t3_1vehzv8 author: ElGuano created_utc: 1785808497 edited: false body: Nice! How did you conclude Trezor is the strongest design, compared to the other multi-source mixing strategies? comment: p1kid55 parent: t3_1vehzv8 author: k_gavivina created_utc: 1785808876 edited: false body:Excerpt only. The complete copy is held offline and backs quotations on this site. The original publication remains the canonical public source.
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The thread gained a SeedSigner discussion, including commenters' views on camera, dice and coin inputs, roll counts and passphrases.
Recovered from the Internet Archive rather than captured by this project. The row records that third-party provenance separately from captures made by this project.
What changed from the previous capture 38 lines
yet coldcard having public code may have only helped it be hacked + +comment: p1s5h3x +parent: t1_p1m1dou +author: Miserable_Hope_3073 +created_utc: 1785898840 +edited: false +body: +can you also check seed signer please? It seems great since its air gapped and made of decentralized components. + +comment: p1snthe +parent: t1_p1s5h3x +author: PrimaryHuckleberry11 +created_utc: 1785905987 +edited: false +body: +It's okay. It has a different architecture for generating seeds. Instead of relying on entropy from PRNG/TRNG, it generates seeds based on user input provided through a camera, dice roll, or coin flip. + +However, AI didn't like the camera input much. It believes that under certain circumstances, it can produce predictable input as well. Dice rolls seem to be preferred for this wallet, but it also made some recommendations for improvements. It doesn't check if the user doesn't enter a weak pattern. + +[https://share-md.com/view?id=cd735452-f5c0-450e-94f7-66494013d0ff](https://share-md.com/view?id=cd735452-f5c0-450e-94f7-66494013d0ff) + +comment: p1ss2h5 +parent: t1_p1snthe +author: Miserable_Hope_3073 +created_utc: 1785907865 +edited: false +body: +Thanks! I will try to understand how entropy and the code-based dice/coin works before getting into crypto. But it seems like this is one of the better wallets. Do you think using physical casino dice is best? + +comment: p1su9wx +parent: t1_p1ss2h5 +author: PrimaryHuckleberry11 +created_utc: 1785908871 +edited: false +body: +No problem. In theory, casino dice is better because it should be really well-balanced. However, I think even standard dice would be pretty good. What matters most is how many rolls you do. You need to go with 99 rolls to get a proper 24-word seed with a 256-bit length. + +If you have SeedSigner, I would have done 99 rolls and, for extra safety, also used a passphrase to your seed. (I don't think a passphrase would improve "randomness," but it would still protect you in an event where someone got your seed.)Extracted text as captured
post: 1vehzv8 author: [deleted] created_utc: 1785773802 title: I compared every major Bitcoin hardware wallet after the Coldcard entropy bug body: [deleted] comment: p1kb4ny parent: t3_1vehzv8 author: AnarchyCheesemonger created_utc: 1785806476 edited: false body: In the case of Tangem you can choose to use a seed phrase. In that case your seed is generated by your phone. “a) In the Android app, we use SecureRandom (used as new SecureRandom(), no algorithm string, no setSeed()), a CSPRNG whose output goes through BoringSSL/Conscrypt to the kernel entropy pool, seeded from interrupt timing, sensors, and the SoC’s hardware TRNG. This means an attacker who sees any amount of output still can’t predict or reconstruct your key material. b) In the iOS app, we use the system-provided SecRandomCopyBytes API, which generates cryptographically secure random bytes suitable for cryptographic key generation. The entropy is sourced, among other things, from the Secure Enclave’s hardware-based true random number generator (TRNG). The security of this approach has been validated through an independent security audit.” comment: p1kdwbv parent: t3_1vehzv8 author: Keefryan created_utc: 1785807395 edited: false body: Thank You. Very helpful. comment: p1kh82v parent: t3_1vehzv8 author: ElGuano created_utc: 1785808497 edited: false body: Nice! How did you conclude Trezor is the strongest design, compared to the other multi-source mixing strategies? comment: p1kid55 parent: t3_1vehzv8 author: k_gavivina created_utc: 1785808876 edited: false body:Excerpt only. The complete copy is held offline and backs quotations on this site. The original publication remains the canonical public source.
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A comment asking how a wallet was heavily restricted was deleted, and its author is now shown as deleted.
Recovered from the Internet Archive rather than captured by this project. The row records that third-party provenance separately from captures made by this project.
What changed from the previous capture 4 lines
comment: p1m5v7a parent: t1_p1lnngn -author: Final_Bite_7228 +author: [deleted] created_utc: 1785834608 edited: false body: -How was it heavily restricted? +[deleted] comment: p1m6uqs parent: t1_p1klmu6Extracted text as captured
post: 1vehzv8 author: [deleted] created_utc: 1785773802 title: I compared every major Bitcoin hardware wallet after the Coldcard entropy bug body: [deleted] comment: p1kb4ny parent: t3_1vehzv8 author: AnarchyCheesemonger created_utc: 1785806476 edited: false body: In the case of Tangem you can choose to use a seed phrase. In that case your seed is generated by your phone. “a) In the Android app, we use SecureRandom (used as new SecureRandom(), no algorithm string, no setSeed()), a CSPRNG whose output goes through BoringSSL/Conscrypt to the kernel entropy pool, seeded from interrupt timing, sensors, and the SoC’s hardware TRNG. This means an attacker who sees any amount of output still can’t predict or reconstruct your key material. b) In the iOS app, we use the system-provided SecRandomCopyBytes API, which generates cryptographically secure random bytes suitable for cryptographic key generation. The entropy is sourced, among other things, from the Secure Enclave’s hardware-based true random number generator (TRNG). The security of this approach has been validated through an independent security audit.” comment: p1kdwbv parent: t3_1vehzv8 author: Keefryan created_utc: 1785807395 edited: false body: Thank You. Very helpful. comment: p1kh82v parent: t3_1vehzv8 author: ElGuano created_utc: 1785808497 edited: false body: Nice! How did you conclude Trezor is the strongest design, compared to the other multi-source mixing strategies? comment: p1kid55 parent: t3_1vehzv8 author: k_gavivina created_utc: 1785808876 edited: false body:Excerpt only. The complete copy is held offline and backs quotations on this site. The original publication remains the canonical public source.
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The post was deleted, replacing its hardware-wallet comparison with "[deleted]" and marking its author deleted.
Recovered from the Internet Archive rather than captured by this project. The row records that third-party provenance separately from captures made by this project.
What changed from the previous capture 73 lines
post: 1vehzv8 -author: TrueRead1435 +author: [deleted] created_utc: 1785773802 title: I compared every major Bitcoin hardware wallet after the Coldcard entropy bug body: -https://preview.redd.it/a38ylnfzp6hh1.png?width=1789&format=png&auto=webp&s=70406b55bd6c2049608753830456ebe98b45feae - -people who stored their btc on coldcard got drained because of entropy. - -the seed generation was reproducible, anyone could recompute their keys. - -so i went through every other hardware wallet to see how they make your seed, and whether the same thing can happen again. - - - -[u/Trezor](https://x.com/Trezor) : mixes the device's randomness with randomness from your computer, and the device has to prove it used both. even if its chip is fully broken, you're still fine. the best design here by far. - - - -[u/BitBoxSwiss](https://x.com/BitBoxSwiss) : 5 separate sources of randomness combined. one bad source can't sink you. open source, reproducible builds, dice supported. - - - -[u/FoundationHQ](https://x.com/FoundationHQ) : built their own randomness circuit out of plain resistors and capacitors, open source, on top of two other sources. no black-box chip to trust. supports dice. - - - -[u/KeystoneWallet](https://x.com/KeystoneWallet) : 2 secure chips from 2 different manufacturers, combined. also lets you roll 99 dice and publishes how to check the result yourself. - - - -[u/Blockstream](https://x.com/Blockstream) : jade pulls from 7 things: radio noise, cpu counters, battery, temperature, camera, your input, the app. very hard to break all of them. - - - -[u/SeedSigner](https://x.com/SeedSigner) : your dice are the only source. no chip to trust at all. and they ship a guide teaching you to verify their own math. weakest hardware, strongest proof. - - - -[u/OneKey](https://x.com/OneKey) : secure element plus mcu combined on device, open source firmware. solid, but you can't add your own randomness. - - - -[u/Ledger](https://x.com/Ledger) : one certified chip (AIS-31, EAL5+). good randomness. but it's a single source, closed source, and you cannot verify any of it. you're trusting them completely. - - - -[u/Tangem](https://x.com/Tangem) : key is born inside the chip and never comes out. audited by three firms. same trade: strong, and impossible for you to check by design. - - - -[u/ngrave\_official](https://x.com/ngrave_official) : mixes chip randomness with your fingerprint and room light. clever. but the "EAL7" badge covers one software component, not the whole device. - - - -[u/ELLIPAL](https://x.com/ELLIPAL) : single certified chip, no software fallback, fails closed instead of guessing. closed source, so take it on faith. - - - -[u/SafePal](https://x.com/SafePal) : 2 chips mixed. they've never published the details. - - - -[u/COLDCARDwallet](https://x.com/COLDCARDwallet) : patched now, and dice on coldcard were always verifiable. but every seed made between 2021 and 2026 is permanently burned. - -one source = ledger, tangem, ellipal. that one source fails, everything fails. their answer is to make it excellent and certified. that's exactly the bet coldcard lost. - -many sources = trezor, bitbox, passport, jade, keystone. one broken source never reaches your key. - -and every one of these claims 128 or 256 bits. - -coldcard did too. certification doesn't help either, coldcard's chip was fine, the code just stopped calling it. - -the only thing that saves you is being able to check. -roll your own dice. verify the words yourself. +[deleted] comment: p1kb4ny parent: t3_1vehzv8Extracted text as captured
post: 1vehzv8 author: [deleted] created_utc: 1785773802 title: I compared every major Bitcoin hardware wallet after the Coldcard entropy bug body: [deleted] comment: p1kb4ny parent: t3_1vehzv8 author: AnarchyCheesemonger created_utc: 1785806476 edited: false body: In the case of Tangem you can choose to use a seed phrase. In that case your seed is generated by your phone. “a) In the Android app, we use SecureRandom (used as new SecureRandom(), no algorithm string, no setSeed()), a CSPRNG whose output goes through BoringSSL/Conscrypt to the kernel entropy pool, seeded from interrupt timing, sensors, and the SoC’s hardware TRNG. This means an attacker who sees any amount of output still can’t predict or reconstruct your key material. b) In the iOS app, we use the system-provided SecRandomCopyBytes API, which generates cryptographically secure random bytes suitable for cryptographic key generation. The entropy is sourced, among other things, from the Secure Enclave’s hardware-based true random number generator (TRNG). The security of this approach has been validated through an independent security audit.” comment: p1kdwbv parent: t3_1vehzv8 author: Keefryan created_utc: 1785807395 edited: false body: Thank You. Very helpful. comment: p1kh82v parent: t3_1vehzv8 author: ElGuano created_utc: 1785808497 edited: false body: Nice! How did you conclude Trezor is the strongest design, compared to the other multi-source mixing strategies? comment: p1kid55 parent: t3_1vehzv8 author: k_gavivina created_utc: 1785808876 edited: false body:Excerpt only. The complete copy is held offline and backs quotations on this site. The original publication remains the canonical public source.
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The Reddit thread gained comments debating open-source verification and Ledger's security team.
Recovered from the Internet Archive rather than captured by this project. The row records that third-party provenance separately from captures made by this project.
What changed from the previous capture 41 lines
Trezor was the first company but Bitbox made the high standard of a super secure wallet whilest being open-source. +comment: p1lplpt +parent: t1_p1lb90a +author: Objective-Run-9104 +created_utc: 1785826497 +edited: false +body: +All good and well but Ledger got hacked and doxxed every buyer + comment: p1lpva0 parent: t1_p1kydv5 author: Objective-Run-9104 body: Only for long term HOLDERS using ledger... If folks generate 25th Passphrase via rolling dice and keep that completely safe and secure elsewhere, engraved in a steel plate, and totally stay disconnected off ledger live or any software app, basically use seed phrase as cold paper wallet and view btc holdings on sparrow wallet should probably be a good approach? +comment: p1md0sw +parent: t1_p1m6uqs +author: Successful-Plenty-27 +created_utc: 1785838081 +edited: false +body: +The consensus for the past decade was that hardware wallets should be open source because then users can verify the code. + +Coldcard was "verifyable source", meaning they used an open source repository (from trezor), but the things they edited were public but not to be used by other commercial products. + +Well, i guess nobody bothered to actually verify the verifyable source, or coinkite straight up fooled them. + +Ledger allegedly is not safe because the source can't be verified. + +I think for a lot of the open source purists this incident with cold card was a hard reality check. + comment: p1md6v4 parent: t3_1vehzv8 author: petitcurieux77 edited: false body: This scares me and I think I’m switching to Trezor because of this + +comment: p1mf24l +parent: t1_p1m8620 +author: Successful-Plenty-27 +created_utc: 1785838986 +edited: false +body: +I have used Ledger for years because i don't know shit about code, but they have an entire security team, the Ledger Donjon. +I'm a bit surprised now, after the coldcard hack, you are still so fiercly advocating for open source and against Ledger. +What is an open source worth if the majority of users is actually not literate enough to spot the issues? + +The choice here you have now is simple, would you choose between a company which invests in security and has an entire team trying to hack it's own products? +Or is a repository dumped on GitHub by 1 guy enough to prove security? + +To be honest, the "open source is better" bubble got popped , and i know the majority of hardware wallets were following this momentum. +But you were all wrong. +How many of you "open source purists" can actually read and understand the code, and have you ever read it? comment: p1mgbyb parent: t1_p1m3b5tExtracted text as captured
post: 1vehzv8 author: TrueRead1435 created_utc: 1785773802 title: I compared every major Bitcoin hardware wallet after the Coldcard entropy bug body: https://preview.redd.it/a38ylnfzp6hh1.png?width=1789&format=png&auto=webp&s=70406b55bd6c2049608753830456ebe98b45feae people who stored their btc on coldcard got drained because of entropy. the seed generation was reproducible, anyone could recompute their keys. so i went through every other hardware wallet to see how they make your seed, and whether the same thing can happen again. [u/Trezor](https://x.com/Trezor) : mixes the device's randomness with randomness from your computer, and the device has to prove it used both. even if its chip is fully broken, you're still fine. the best design here by far. [u/BitBoxSwiss](https://x.com/BitBoxSwiss) : 5 separate sources of randomness combined. one bad source can't sink you. open source, reproducible builds, dice supported. [u/FoundationHQ](https://x.com/FoundationHQ) : built their own randomness circuit out of plain resistors and capacitors, open source, on top of two other sources. no black-box chip to trust. supports dice. [u/KeystoneWallet](https://x.com/KeystoneWallet) : 2 secure chips from 2 different manufacturers, combined. also lets you roll 99 dice and publishes how to check the result yourself. [u/Blockstream](https://x.com/Blockstream) : jade pulls from 7 things: radio noise, cpu counters, battery, temperature, camera, your input, the app. very hard to break all of them. [u/SeedSigner](https://x.com/SeedSigner) : your dice are the only source. no chip to trust at all. and they ship a guide teaching you to verify their own math. weakest hardware, strongest proof. [u/OneKey](https://x.com/OneKey) : secure element plus mcu combined on device, open source firmware. solid, but you can't add your own randomness.Excerpt only. The complete copy is held offline and backs quotations on this site. The original publication remains the canonical public source.
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The Reddit thread gained a comment arguing that hardware wallets are difficult to recommend to non-technical users.
Recovered from the Internet Archive rather than captured by this project. The row records that third-party provenance separately from captures made by this project.
What changed from the previous capture 8 lines
body: I’m old enough to remember when Trezor and Ledger were universally understood to be the only safe options for cold storage. Fascinating to watch this wisdom somehow get lost over the years. +comment: p1ojdpa +parent: t3_1vehzv8 +author: CTchippy +created_utc: 1785861797 +edited: false +body: +Now convinced more people will lose money to ponzi schemes (ftx, Celcius, etc.) or crytographic incompetence than they would've from inflation.. hard to recommend this asset to anyone not deeply technical in cyber security, cryptography, and/or software engineering. + comment: p1oxvo5 parent: t1_p1l8you author: SmallDodgyCamelExtracted text as captured
post: 1vehzv8 author: TrueRead1435 created_utc: 1785773802 title: I compared every major Bitcoin hardware wallet after the Coldcard entropy bug body: https://preview.redd.it/a38ylnfzp6hh1.png?width=1789&format=png&auto=webp&s=70406b55bd6c2049608753830456ebe98b45feae people who stored their btc on coldcard got drained because of entropy. the seed generation was reproducible, anyone could recompute their keys. so i went through every other hardware wallet to see how they make your seed, and whether the same thing can happen again. [u/Trezor](https://x.com/Trezor) : mixes the device's randomness with randomness from your computer, and the device has to prove it used both. even if its chip is fully broken, you're still fine. the best design here by far. [u/BitBoxSwiss](https://x.com/BitBoxSwiss) : 5 separate sources of randomness combined. one bad source can't sink you. open source, reproducible builds, dice supported. [u/FoundationHQ](https://x.com/FoundationHQ) : built their own randomness circuit out of plain resistors and capacitors, open source, on top of two other sources. no black-box chip to trust. supports dice. [u/KeystoneWallet](https://x.com/KeystoneWallet) : 2 secure chips from 2 different manufacturers, combined. also lets you roll 99 dice and publishes how to check the result yourself. [u/Blockstream](https://x.com/Blockstream) : jade pulls from 7 things: radio noise, cpu counters, battery, temperature, camera, your input, the app. very hard to break all of them. [u/SeedSigner](https://x.com/SeedSigner) : your dice are the only source. no chip to trust at all. and they ship a guide teaching you to verify their own math. weakest hardware, strongest proof. [u/OneKey](https://x.com/OneKey) : secure element plus mcu combined on device, open source firmware. solid, but you can't add your own randomness.Excerpt only. The complete copy is held offline and backs quotations on this site. The original publication remains the canonical public source.
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The Reddit thread gained 1 new comment about public code and the incident.
Recovered from the Internet Archive rather than captured by this project. The row records that third-party provenance separately from captures made by this project.
What changed from the previous capture 10 lines
edited: false body: To where? + +comment: p1qnahr +parent: t1_p1ma7x4 +author: WebPlenty2337 +created_utc: 1785881493 +edited: false +body: +yet coldcard having public code may have only helped it be hacked + +Extracted text as captured
post: 1vehzv8 author: TrueRead1435 created_utc: 1785773802 title: I compared every major Bitcoin hardware wallet after the Coldcard entropy bug body: https://preview.redd.it/a38ylnfzp6hh1.png?width=1789&format=png&auto=webp&s=70406b55bd6c2049608753830456ebe98b45feae people who stored their btc on coldcard got drained because of entropy. the seed generation was reproducible, anyone could recompute their keys. so i went through every other hardware wallet to see how they make your seed, and whether the same thing can happen again. [u/Trezor](https://x.com/Trezor) : mixes the device's randomness with randomness from your computer, and the device has to prove it used both. even if its chip is fully broken, you're still fine. the best design here by far. [u/BitBoxSwiss](https://x.com/BitBoxSwiss) : 5 separate sources of randomness combined. one bad source can't sink you. open source, reproducible builds, dice supported. [u/FoundationHQ](https://x.com/FoundationHQ) : built their own randomness circuit out of plain resistors and capacitors, open source, on top of two other sources. no black-box chip to trust. supports dice. [u/KeystoneWallet](https://x.com/KeystoneWallet) : 2 secure chips from 2 different manufacturers, combined. also lets you roll 99 dice and publishes how to check the result yourself. [u/Blockstream](https://x.com/Blockstream) : jade pulls from 7 things: radio noise, cpu counters, battery, temperature, camera, your input, the app. very hard to break all of them. [u/SeedSigner](https://x.com/SeedSigner) : your dice are the only source. no chip to trust at all. and they ship a guide teaching you to verify their own math. weakest hardware, strongest proof. [u/OneKey](https://x.com/OneKey) : secure element plus mcu combined on device, open source firmware. solid, but you can't add your own randomness.Excerpt only. The complete copy is held offline and backs quotations on this site. The original publication remains the canonical public source.
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The Reddit thread gained 1 new comment.
Recovered from the Internet Archive rather than captured by this project. The row records that third-party provenance separately from captures made by this project.
What changed from the previous capture 8 lines
Replace ordinary equality with constant-time comparison for secret values. Reduce reliance on panics in security-sensitive paths and prefer explicit error handling. Without dynamic analysis or review of dependent components (especially SyncCell, bitbox\_aes, the secure-chip interface, and the memory abstraction), I don't see a clear cryptographic break or authentication bypass in the provided code. + +comment: p1qclnn +parent: t1_p1mz2qc +author: 12ealdeal +created_utc: 1785878499 +edited: false +body: +To where?Extracted text as captured
post: 1vehzv8 author: TrueRead1435 created_utc: 1785773802 title: I compared every major Bitcoin hardware wallet after the Coldcard entropy bug body: https://preview.redd.it/a38ylnfzp6hh1.png?width=1789&format=png&auto=webp&s=70406b55bd6c2049608753830456ebe98b45feae people who stored their btc on coldcard got drained because of entropy. the seed generation was reproducible, anyone could recompute their keys. so i went through every other hardware wallet to see how they make your seed, and whether the same thing can happen again. [u/Trezor](https://x.com/Trezor) : mixes the device's randomness with randomness from your computer, and the device has to prove it used both. even if its chip is fully broken, you're still fine. the best design here by far. [u/BitBoxSwiss](https://x.com/BitBoxSwiss) : 5 separate sources of randomness combined. one bad source can't sink you. open source, reproducible builds, dice supported. [u/FoundationHQ](https://x.com/FoundationHQ) : built their own randomness circuit out of plain resistors and capacitors, open source, on top of two other sources. no black-box chip to trust. supports dice. [u/KeystoneWallet](https://x.com/KeystoneWallet) : 2 secure chips from 2 different manufacturers, combined. also lets you roll 99 dice and publishes how to check the result yourself. [u/Blockstream](https://x.com/Blockstream) : jade pulls from 7 things: radio noise, cpu counters, battery, temperature, camera, your input, the app. very hard to break all of them. [u/SeedSigner](https://x.com/SeedSigner) : your dice are the only source. no chip to trust at all. and they ship a guide teaching you to verify their own math. weakest hardware, strongest proof. [u/OneKey](https://x.com/OneKey) : secure element plus mcu combined on device, open source firmware. solid, but you can't add your own randomness.Excerpt only. The complete copy is held offline and backs quotations on this site. The original publication remains the canonical public source.
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The Reddit thread gained 2 new comments.
Recovered from the Internet Archive rather than captured by this project. The row records that third-party provenance separately from captures made by this project.
What changed from the previous capture 30 lines
edited: false body: What is the checksum? + +comment: p1pvobn +parent: t3_1vehzv8 +author: Flowa-Powa +created_utc: 1785873982 +edited: false +body: +I moved from Ledger to Coldcard. + +I told my noob friends to use Trezor at around the same time because it was more user friendly. I should have taken my own advice. + +comment: p1pyb0v +parent: t1_p1o42ri +author: tenor_tymir +created_utc: 1785874678 +edited: 1785875292 +body: +Thank you for the detailed explanation. Commenting the code is a very good idea so that other LLMs understand it correctly from the start. Since many people and computing power will now be scrutinizing your code, there should be no more doubt about its functionality. + +Here’s what chatGPT is suggesting: + +**Overall assessment** +From a security engineering perspective, this code appears significantly stronger than typical wallet implementations. It demonstrates good practices such as authenticated encryption, separation of long-term and retained keys, secure-element-backed key derivation, zeroization of many sensitive values, password stretch migration, and extensive testing. +The issues I found are mostly hardening opportunities rather than obvious exploitable vulnerabilities. The ones I'd prioritize are: +Add bounds checking to ReadOnlyBuffer::from\_slice(). +Ensure RetainedEncryptedBuffer and ReadOnlyBuffer are explicitly zeroized on overwrite/drop. +Audit SyncCell to confirm old values are wiped and accesses are atomic. +Replace ordinary equality with constant-time comparison for secret values. +Reduce reliance on panics in security-sensitive paths and prefer explicit error handling. +Without dynamic analysis or review of dependent components (especially SyncCell, bitbox\_aes, the secure-chip interface, and the memory abstraction), I don't see a clear cryptographic break or authentication bypass in the provided code.Extracted text as captured
post: 1vehzv8 author: TrueRead1435 created_utc: 1785773802 title: I compared every major Bitcoin hardware wallet after the Coldcard entropy bug body: https://preview.redd.it/a38ylnfzp6hh1.png?width=1789&format=png&auto=webp&s=70406b55bd6c2049608753830456ebe98b45feae people who stored their btc on coldcard got drained because of entropy. the seed generation was reproducible, anyone could recompute their keys. so i went through every other hardware wallet to see how they make your seed, and whether the same thing can happen again. [u/Trezor](https://x.com/Trezor) : mixes the device's randomness with randomness from your computer, and the device has to prove it used both. even if its chip is fully broken, you're still fine. the best design here by far. [u/BitBoxSwiss](https://x.com/BitBoxSwiss) : 5 separate sources of randomness combined. one bad source can't sink you. open source, reproducible builds, dice supported. [u/FoundationHQ](https://x.com/FoundationHQ) : built their own randomness circuit out of plain resistors and capacitors, open source, on top of two other sources. no black-box chip to trust. supports dice. [u/KeystoneWallet](https://x.com/KeystoneWallet) : 2 secure chips from 2 different manufacturers, combined. also lets you roll 99 dice and publishes how to check the result yourself. [u/Blockstream](https://x.com/Blockstream) : jade pulls from 7 things: radio noise, cpu counters, battery, temperature, camera, your input, the app. very hard to break all of them. [u/SeedSigner](https://x.com/SeedSigner) : your dice are the only source. no chip to trust at all. and they ship a guide teaching you to verify their own math. weakest hardware, strongest proof. [u/OneKey](https://x.com/OneKey) : secure element plus mcu combined on device, open source firmware. solid, but you can't add your own randomness.Excerpt only. The complete copy is held offline and backs quotations on this site. The original publication remains the canonical public source.
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The Reddit thread gained 2 new comments.
Recovered from the Internet Archive rather than captured by this project. The row records that third-party provenance separately from captures made by this project.
What changed from the previous capture 16 lines
Ledger is VC backed, which does boost its credibility substantially. I just wish people can covert BTC to ETF shares, then no one would have to worry about cold storage bullshit. + +comment: p1pl79f +parent: t3_1vehzv8 +author: pistonian +created_utc: 1785871228 +edited: false +body: +Lesson to learn: close source software can be exposed as much as companies want to keep it secret, so if a closed course company has a bug in their code, and the source code is made public, it could very well have a bug like ColdCard. + +comment: p1pq9rs +parent: t1_p1m3r9m +author: Awkward-Silver1333 +created_utc: 1785872556 +edited: false +body: +What is the checksum?Extracted text as captured
post: 1vehzv8 author: TrueRead1435 created_utc: 1785773802 title: I compared every major Bitcoin hardware wallet after the Coldcard entropy bug body: https://preview.redd.it/a38ylnfzp6hh1.png?width=1789&format=png&auto=webp&s=70406b55bd6c2049608753830456ebe98b45feae people who stored their btc on coldcard got drained because of entropy. the seed generation was reproducible, anyone could recompute their keys. so i went through every other hardware wallet to see how they make your seed, and whether the same thing can happen again. [u/Trezor](https://x.com/Trezor) : mixes the device's randomness with randomness from your computer, and the device has to prove it used both. even if its chip is fully broken, you're still fine. the best design here by far. [u/BitBoxSwiss](https://x.com/BitBoxSwiss) : 5 separate sources of randomness combined. one bad source can't sink you. open source, reproducible builds, dice supported. [u/FoundationHQ](https://x.com/FoundationHQ) : built their own randomness circuit out of plain resistors and capacitors, open source, on top of two other sources. no black-box chip to trust. supports dice. [u/KeystoneWallet](https://x.com/KeystoneWallet) : 2 secure chips from 2 different manufacturers, combined. also lets you roll 99 dice and publishes how to check the result yourself. [u/Blockstream](https://x.com/Blockstream) : jade pulls from 7 things: radio noise, cpu counters, battery, temperature, camera, your input, the app. very hard to break all of them. [u/SeedSigner](https://x.com/SeedSigner) : your dice are the only source. no chip to trust at all. and they ship a guide teaching you to verify their own math. weakest hardware, strongest proof. [u/OneKey](https://x.com/OneKey) : secure element plus mcu combined on device, open source firmware. solid, but you can't add your own randomness.Excerpt only. The complete copy is held offline and backs quotations on this site. The original publication remains the canonical public source.
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The Reddit thread gained 1 new comment.
Recovered from the Internet Archive rather than captured by this project. The row records that third-party provenance separately from captures made by this project.
What changed from the previous capture 10 lines
edited: false body: Same. Self custody seems too risky now. I’ll trust the heavily audited giant public companies with huge anti fraud teams + +comment: p1phazv +parent: t1_p1klmu6 +author: ihavenotimeforgames2 +created_utc: 1785870222 +edited: false +body: +Ledger is VC backed, which does boost its credibility substantially. + +I just wish people can covert BTC to ETF shares, then no one would have to worry about cold storage bullshit.Extracted text as captured
post: 1vehzv8 author: TrueRead1435 created_utc: 1785773802 title: I compared every major Bitcoin hardware wallet after the Coldcard entropy bug body: https://preview.redd.it/a38ylnfzp6hh1.png?width=1789&format=png&auto=webp&s=70406b55bd6c2049608753830456ebe98b45feae people who stored their btc on coldcard got drained because of entropy. the seed generation was reproducible, anyone could recompute their keys. so i went through every other hardware wallet to see how they make your seed, and whether the same thing can happen again. [u/Trezor](https://x.com/Trezor) : mixes the device's randomness with randomness from your computer, and the device has to prove it used both. even if its chip is fully broken, you're still fine. the best design here by far. [u/BitBoxSwiss](https://x.com/BitBoxSwiss) : 5 separate sources of randomness combined. one bad source can't sink you. open source, reproducible builds, dice supported. [u/FoundationHQ](https://x.com/FoundationHQ) : built their own randomness circuit out of plain resistors and capacitors, open source, on top of two other sources. no black-box chip to trust. supports dice. [u/KeystoneWallet](https://x.com/KeystoneWallet) : 2 secure chips from 2 different manufacturers, combined. also lets you roll 99 dice and publishes how to check the result yourself. [u/Blockstream](https://x.com/Blockstream) : jade pulls from 7 things: radio noise, cpu counters, battery, temperature, camera, your input, the app. very hard to break all of them. [u/SeedSigner](https://x.com/SeedSigner) : your dice are the only source. no chip to trust at all. and they ship a guide teaching you to verify their own math. weakest hardware, strongest proof. [u/OneKey](https://x.com/OneKey) : secure element plus mcu combined on device, open source firmware. solid, but you can't add your own randomness.Excerpt only. The complete copy is held offline and backs quotations on this site. The original publication remains the canonical public source.
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The Reddit thread gained 2 new comments.
Recovered from the Internet Archive rather than captured by this project. The row records that third-party provenance separately from captures made by this project.
What changed from the previous capture 16 lines
edited: false body: Bitbox missing? + +comment: p1pb81j +parent: t3_1vehzv8 +author: Viking_13v +created_utc: 1785868684 +edited: false +body: +What do you think of Bitbox 02 Nova? + +comment: p1pcxle +parent: t1_p1l9rh0 +author: GettinWiggyWiddit +created_utc: 1785869115 +edited: false +body: +Same. Self custody seems too risky now. I’ll trust the heavily audited giant public companies with huge anti fraud teamsExtracted text as captured
post: 1vehzv8 author: TrueRead1435 created_utc: 1785773802 title: I compared every major Bitcoin hardware wallet after the Coldcard entropy bug body: https://preview.redd.it/a38ylnfzp6hh1.png?width=1789&format=png&auto=webp&s=70406b55bd6c2049608753830456ebe98b45feae people who stored their btc on coldcard got drained because of entropy. the seed generation was reproducible, anyone could recompute their keys. so i went through every other hardware wallet to see how they make your seed, and whether the same thing can happen again. [u/Trezor](https://x.com/Trezor) : mixes the device's randomness with randomness from your computer, and the device has to prove it used both. even if its chip is fully broken, you're still fine. the best design here by far. [u/BitBoxSwiss](https://x.com/BitBoxSwiss) : 5 separate sources of randomness combined. one bad source can't sink you. open source, reproducible builds, dice supported. [u/FoundationHQ](https://x.com/FoundationHQ) : built their own randomness circuit out of plain resistors and capacitors, open source, on top of two other sources. no black-box chip to trust. supports dice. [u/KeystoneWallet](https://x.com/KeystoneWallet) : 2 secure chips from 2 different manufacturers, combined. also lets you roll 99 dice and publishes how to check the result yourself. [u/Blockstream](https://x.com/Blockstream) : jade pulls from 7 things: radio noise, cpu counters, battery, temperature, camera, your input, the app. very hard to break all of them. [u/SeedSigner](https://x.com/SeedSigner) : your dice are the only source. no chip to trust at all. and they ship a guide teaching you to verify their own math. weakest hardware, strongest proof. [u/OneKey](https://x.com/OneKey) : secure element plus mcu combined on device, open source firmware. solid, but you can't add your own randomness.Excerpt only. The complete copy is held offline and backs quotations on this site. The original publication remains the canonical public source.
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The Reddit thread gained 2 new comments.
Recovered from the Internet Archive rather than captured by this project. The row records that third-party provenance separately from captures made by this project.
What changed from the previous capture 16 lines
edited: false body: I’m old enough to remember when Trezor and Ledger were universally understood to be the only safe options for cold storage. Fascinating to watch this wisdom somehow get lost over the years. + +comment: p1oxvo5 +parent: t1_p1l8you +author: SmallDodgyCamel +created_utc: 1785865382 +edited: false +body: +Almost? You have some misgivings? + +comment: p1oy55i +parent: t3_1vehzv8 +author: Saddath +created_utc: 1785865445 +edited: false +body: +Bitbox missing?Extracted text as captured
post: 1vehzv8 author: TrueRead1435 created_utc: 1785773802 title: I compared every major Bitcoin hardware wallet after the Coldcard entropy bug body: https://preview.redd.it/a38ylnfzp6hh1.png?width=1789&format=png&auto=webp&s=70406b55bd6c2049608753830456ebe98b45feae people who stored their btc on coldcard got drained because of entropy. the seed generation was reproducible, anyone could recompute their keys. so i went through every other hardware wallet to see how they make your seed, and whether the same thing can happen again. [u/Trezor](https://x.com/Trezor) : mixes the device's randomness with randomness from your computer, and the device has to prove it used both. even if its chip is fully broken, you're still fine. the best design here by far. [u/BitBoxSwiss](https://x.com/BitBoxSwiss) : 5 separate sources of randomness combined. one bad source can't sink you. open source, reproducible builds, dice supported. [u/FoundationHQ](https://x.com/FoundationHQ) : built their own randomness circuit out of plain resistors and capacitors, open source, on top of two other sources. no black-box chip to trust. supports dice. [u/KeystoneWallet](https://x.com/KeystoneWallet) : 2 secure chips from 2 different manufacturers, combined. also lets you roll 99 dice and publishes how to check the result yourself. [u/Blockstream](https://x.com/Blockstream) : jade pulls from 7 things: radio noise, cpu counters, battery, temperature, camera, your input, the app. very hard to break all of them. [u/SeedSigner](https://x.com/SeedSigner) : your dice are the only source. no chip to trust at all. and they ship a guide teaching you to verify their own math. weakest hardware, strongest proof. [u/OneKey](https://x.com/OneKey) : secure element plus mcu combined on device, open source firmware. solid, but you can't add your own randomness.Excerpt only. The complete copy is held offline and backs quotations on this site. The original publication remains the canonical public source.
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The Reddit thread gained 1 new comment.
Recovered from the Internet Archive rather than captured by this project. The row records that third-party provenance separately from captures made by this project.
What changed from the previous capture 8 lines
edited: false body: I’m surprised more people don’t use secux. + +comment: p1oeq7r +parent: t3_1vehzv8 +author: cryptoopotamus +created_utc: 1785860632 +edited: false +body: +I’m old enough to remember when Trezor and Ledger were universally understood to be the only safe options for cold storage. Fascinating to watch this wisdom somehow get lost over the years.Extracted text as captured
post: 1vehzv8 author: TrueRead1435 created_utc: 1785773802 title: I compared every major Bitcoin hardware wallet after the Coldcard entropy bug body: https://preview.redd.it/a38ylnfzp6hh1.png?width=1789&format=png&auto=webp&s=70406b55bd6c2049608753830456ebe98b45feae people who stored their btc on coldcard got drained because of entropy. the seed generation was reproducible, anyone could recompute their keys. so i went through every other hardware wallet to see how they make your seed, and whether the same thing can happen again. [u/Trezor](https://x.com/Trezor) : mixes the device's randomness with randomness from your computer, and the device has to prove it used both. even if its chip is fully broken, you're still fine. the best design here by far. [u/BitBoxSwiss](https://x.com/BitBoxSwiss) : 5 separate sources of randomness combined. one bad source can't sink you. open source, reproducible builds, dice supported. [u/FoundationHQ](https://x.com/FoundationHQ) : built their own randomness circuit out of plain resistors and capacitors, open source, on top of two other sources. no black-box chip to trust. supports dice. [u/KeystoneWallet](https://x.com/KeystoneWallet) : 2 secure chips from 2 different manufacturers, combined. also lets you roll 99 dice and publishes how to check the result yourself. [u/Blockstream](https://x.com/Blockstream) : jade pulls from 7 things: radio noise, cpu counters, battery, temperature, camera, your input, the app. very hard to break all of them. [u/SeedSigner](https://x.com/SeedSigner) : your dice are the only source. no chip to trust at all. and they ship a guide teaching you to verify their own math. weakest hardware, strongest proof. [u/OneKey](https://x.com/OneKey) : secure element plus mcu combined on device, open source firmware. solid, but you can't add your own randomness.Excerpt only. The complete copy is held offline and backs quotations on this site. The original publication remains the canonical public source.
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1 new Reddit comment was posted, by Hero_Dose, mentioning SecuX.
Recovered from the Internet Archive rather than captured by this project. The row records that third-party provenance separately from captures made by this project.
What changed from the previous capture 8 lines
So it's SHA-256( secure chip TRNG xor MCU TRNG xor factory entropy) xor host entropy xor user password entropy Hope this helped, we will be adding comments to the code to prevent this confusions in the future! + +comment: p1o8htx +parent: t3_1vehzv8 +author: Hero_Dose +created_utc: 1785859055 +edited: false +body: +I’m surprised more people don’t use secux.Extracted text as captured
post: 1vehzv8 author: TrueRead1435 created_utc: 1785773802 title: I compared every major Bitcoin hardware wallet after the Coldcard entropy bug body: https://preview.redd.it/a38ylnfzp6hh1.png?width=1789&format=png&auto=webp&s=70406b55bd6c2049608753830456ebe98b45feae people who stored their btc on coldcard got drained because of entropy. the seed generation was reproducible, anyone could recompute their keys. so i went through every other hardware wallet to see how they make your seed, and whether the same thing can happen again. [u/Trezor](https://x.com/Trezor) : mixes the device's randomness with randomness from your computer, and the device has to prove it used both. even if its chip is fully broken, you're still fine. the best design here by far. [u/BitBoxSwiss](https://x.com/BitBoxSwiss) : 5 separate sources of randomness combined. one bad source can't sink you. open source, reproducible builds, dice supported. [u/FoundationHQ](https://x.com/FoundationHQ) : built their own randomness circuit out of plain resistors and capacitors, open source, on top of two other sources. no black-box chip to trust. supports dice. [u/KeystoneWallet](https://x.com/KeystoneWallet) : 2 secure chips from 2 different manufacturers, combined. also lets you roll 99 dice and publishes how to check the result yourself. [u/Blockstream](https://x.com/Blockstream) : jade pulls from 7 things: radio noise, cpu counters, battery, temperature, camera, your input, the app. very hard to break all of them. [u/SeedSigner](https://x.com/SeedSigner) : your dice are the only source. no chip to trust at all. and they ship a guide teaching you to verify their own math. weakest hardware, strongest proof. [u/OneKey](https://x.com/OneKey) : secure element plus mcu combined on device, open source firmware. solid, but you can't add your own randomness.Excerpt only. The complete copy is held offline and backs quotations on this site. The original publication remains the canonical public source.
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2 new Reddit comments were posted, including a BitBox representative describing five claimed seed-entropy inputs and linking its code.
Recovered from the Internet Archive rather than captured by this project. The row records that third-party provenance separately from captures made by this project.
What changed from the previous capture 32 lines
End of ColdCard -shrugs- End of Ledger -real shit???- + +comment: p1o2ltu +parent: t1_p1njgd5 +author: striata +created_utc: 1785857561 +edited: false +body: +You're a bit wrong though. Technically the term "open source" as defined by OSI has a somewhat strict definition which requires an open license together with the source. + +However, it's completely irrelevant in this case. We'd be in the exact same situation if it was truly open source. Some people do argue that the project would have more eyes if the source was free, but I doubt it + +comment: p1o42ri +parent: t1_p1m6z0z +author: pako-bitbox +created_utc: 1785857938 +edited: false +body: +Hi thanks for the tag! We reviewed the audit and the claim of 3 entropy sources seem to just be a mistake by the LLM. + +As you can see in section **2.5 Seed Generation** it shows a block of code, more specifically this our seed entropy generation code which you can find in our Github here: [keystore.rs # Line 557](https://github.com/BitBoxSwiss/bitbox02-firmware/blob/c838d7fd80190a02531ba30e4a904240e4485e1f/src/rust/bitbox02-rust/src/keystore.rs#L577) + +There are more entropy source than just this, one our engineers explains it: + +1. This function queries the secure chip for entropy and calls another function: [ random.rs # Line 32 - Line 41](https://github.com/BitBoxSwiss/bitbox02-firmware/blob/master/src/rust/bitbox-core-utils/src/random.rs#L32-L41) (total entropy sources: 1) + +that other function queries the MCU trng for entropy, and mixes with the secure chip entropy and factory randomness: [random.rs # Line 9 - Line 30](https://github.com/BitBoxSwiss/bitbox02-firmware/blob/master/src/rust/bitbox-core-utils/src/random.rs#L9-L30) (total entropy sources: 3) + +and the above function is called here, where host entropy and user password are finally mixed in as well: [keystore.rs # Line 577 - Line 608](https://github.com/BitBoxSwiss/bitbox02-firmware/blob/c838d7fd80190a02531ba30e4a904240e4485e1f/src/rust/bitbox02-rust/src/keystore.rs#L577-L608) (total entropy sources: 5) + +So it's SHA-256( secure chip TRNG xor MCU TRNG xor factory entropy) xor host entropy xor user password entropy + +Hope this helped, we will be adding comments to the code to prevent this confusions in the future!Extracted text as captured
post: 1vehzv8 author: TrueRead1435 created_utc: 1785773802 title: I compared every major Bitcoin hardware wallet after the Coldcard entropy bug body: https://preview.redd.it/a38ylnfzp6hh1.png?width=1789&format=png&auto=webp&s=70406b55bd6c2049608753830456ebe98b45feae people who stored their btc on coldcard got drained because of entropy. the seed generation was reproducible, anyone could recompute their keys. so i went through every other hardware wallet to see how they make your seed, and whether the same thing can happen again. [u/Trezor](https://x.com/Trezor) : mixes the device's randomness with randomness from your computer, and the device has to prove it used both. even if its chip is fully broken, you're still fine. the best design here by far. [u/BitBoxSwiss](https://x.com/BitBoxSwiss) : 5 separate sources of randomness combined. one bad source can't sink you. open source, reproducible builds, dice supported. [u/FoundationHQ](https://x.com/FoundationHQ) : built their own randomness circuit out of plain resistors and capacitors, open source, on top of two other sources. no black-box chip to trust. supports dice. [u/KeystoneWallet](https://x.com/KeystoneWallet) : 2 secure chips from 2 different manufacturers, combined. also lets you roll 99 dice and publishes how to check the result yourself. [u/Blockstream](https://x.com/Blockstream) : jade pulls from 7 things: radio noise, cpu counters, battery, temperature, camera, your input, the app. very hard to break all of them. [u/SeedSigner](https://x.com/SeedSigner) : your dice are the only source. no chip to trust at all. and they ship a guide teaching you to verify their own math. weakest hardware, strongest proof. [u/OneKey](https://x.com/OneKey) : secure element plus mcu combined on device, open source firmware. solid, but you can't add your own randomness.Excerpt only. The complete copy is held offline and backs quotations on this site. The original publication remains the canonical public source.
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1 new Reddit comment was posted, including Dextradomis.
Recovered from the Internet Archive rather than captured by this project. The row records that third-party provenance separately from captures made by this project.
What changed from the previous capture 16 lines
parent: t1_p1m0kyf author: OldHamburger7923 created_utc: 1785833025 -edited: false +edited: 1785853763 body: So doesn't that mean we see the associated code and this this isn't closed source with hidden logic? + +Edit: people on reddit think if it isn't gpl it isn't open source. Open source doesn't require gpl. comment: p1m3b5t parent: t1_p1klmu6 edited: false body: You can roll your own rng/seed for any wallet really, you just need to either do the math yourself or use any number of open source tools to convert the dice rolls into a seed and mnemonic. Id cross reference multiple tools and see if the output is the same before trusting. Iancoleman.io is a really cool site for stuff like this. Though I would download the page, then re-open it offline on pc with no storage or network (live boot debian, tails, etc). + +Then restore the wallet in your hardware of choice using the mnemonic you generated. + +comment: p1nqm2u +parent: t3_1vehzv8 +author: Dextradomis +created_utc: 1785854423 +edited: false +body: +End of ColdCard -shrugs- + +End of Ledger -real shit???-Extracted text as captured
post: 1vehzv8 author: TrueRead1435 created_utc: 1785773802 title: I compared every major Bitcoin hardware wallet after the Coldcard entropy bug body: https://preview.redd.it/a38ylnfzp6hh1.png?width=1789&format=png&auto=webp&s=70406b55bd6c2049608753830456ebe98b45feae people who stored their btc on coldcard got drained because of entropy. the seed generation was reproducible, anyone could recompute their keys. so i went through every other hardware wallet to see how they make your seed, and whether the same thing can happen again. [u/Trezor](https://x.com/Trezor) : mixes the device's randomness with randomness from your computer, and the device has to prove it used both. even if its chip is fully broken, you're still fine. the best design here by far. [u/BitBoxSwiss](https://x.com/BitBoxSwiss) : 5 separate sources of randomness combined. one bad source can't sink you. open source, reproducible builds, dice supported. [u/FoundationHQ](https://x.com/FoundationHQ) : built their own randomness circuit out of plain resistors and capacitors, open source, on top of two other sources. no black-box chip to trust. supports dice. [u/KeystoneWallet](https://x.com/KeystoneWallet) : 2 secure chips from 2 different manufacturers, combined. also lets you roll 99 dice and publishes how to check the result yourself. [u/Blockstream](https://x.com/Blockstream) : jade pulls from 7 things: radio noise, cpu counters, battery, temperature, camera, your input, the app. very hard to break all of them. [u/SeedSigner](https://x.com/SeedSigner) : your dice are the only source. no chip to trust at all. and they ship a guide teaching you to verify their own math. weakest hardware, strongest proof. [u/OneKey](https://x.com/OneKey) : secure element plus mcu combined on device, open source firmware. solid, but you can't add your own randomness.Excerpt only. The complete copy is held offline and backs quotations on this site. The original publication remains the canonical public source.
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2 new Reddit comments were posted, including OldHamburger7923,disruptioncoin.
Recovered from the Internet Archive rather than captured by this project. The row records that third-party provenance separately from captures made by this project.
What changed from the previous capture 20 lines
edited: 1785850711 body: This. The coldcard exploit wasn’t a hardware or engineering failure. I wouldn’t even call it a software bug. This was a problem with their build process. This is where the argument about open source vs. verifiable source falls down. Unless you were building for the same hardware and using the same build process, you would never find this bug. Therefore it very unlikely any open source implementation would have flagged this. This kind of problem is easy to miss and could very well be in any competing implementation. If I were on the engineering team, I would be a fruitcake about ensuring the RNG was running because it’s the one thing you can’t really unit test. My first thought would be to get rid of any software PRNGs to reduce the risk of them being used. After that, I would probably test on a board with the RNG chip removed to ensure its output is necessary and being used. I would test it many different ways because I have experienced similar surprises where I was confident something was solid when it reality it was subtly broken. + +comment: p1njgd5 +parent: t1_p1n92xm +author: OldHamburger7923 +created_utc: 1785852509 +edited: false +body: +You should look it up. Open source means you can see the source. + +Open source licencing takes many forms. GPL is just one of many. It can be open source without you being able to take it and use it commercially for yourself. + +I swear, the people on reddit get dumber every day. + +comment: p1nkwnb +parent: t3_1vehzv8 +author: disruptioncoin +created_utc: 1785852902 +edited: false +body: +You can roll your own rng/seed for any wallet really, you just need to either do the math yourself or use any number of open source tools to convert the dice rolls into a seed and mnemonic. Id cross reference multiple tools and see if the output is the same before trusting. Iancoleman.io is a really cool site for stuff like this. Though I would download the page, then re-open it offline on pc with no storage or network (live boot debian, tails, etc).Extracted text as captured
post: 1vehzv8 author: TrueRead1435 created_utc: 1785773802 title: I compared every major Bitcoin hardware wallet after the Coldcard entropy bug body: https://preview.redd.it/a38ylnfzp6hh1.png?width=1789&format=png&auto=webp&s=70406b55bd6c2049608753830456ebe98b45feae people who stored their btc on coldcard got drained because of entropy. the seed generation was reproducible, anyone could recompute their keys. so i went through every other hardware wallet to see how they make your seed, and whether the same thing can happen again. [u/Trezor](https://x.com/Trezor) : mixes the device's randomness with randomness from your computer, and the device has to prove it used both. even if its chip is fully broken, you're still fine. the best design here by far. [u/BitBoxSwiss](https://x.com/BitBoxSwiss) : 5 separate sources of randomness combined. one bad source can't sink you. open source, reproducible builds, dice supported. [u/FoundationHQ](https://x.com/FoundationHQ) : built their own randomness circuit out of plain resistors and capacitors, open source, on top of two other sources. no black-box chip to trust. supports dice. [u/KeystoneWallet](https://x.com/KeystoneWallet) : 2 secure chips from 2 different manufacturers, combined. also lets you roll 99 dice and publishes how to check the result yourself. [u/Blockstream](https://x.com/Blockstream) : jade pulls from 7 things: radio noise, cpu counters, battery, temperature, camera, your input, the app. very hard to break all of them. [u/SeedSigner](https://x.com/SeedSigner) : your dice are the only source. no chip to trust at all. and they ship a guide teaching you to verify their own math. weakest hardware, strongest proof. [u/OneKey](https://x.com/OneKey) : secure element plus mcu combined on device, open source firmware. solid, but you can't add your own randomness.Excerpt only. The complete copy is held offline and backs quotations on this site. The original publication remains the canonical public source.
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46 new Reddit comments were posted, including slvbtc,pcvcolin,TheDuhbb.
Recovered from the Internet Archive rather than captured by this project. The row records that third-party provenance separately from captures made by this project.
What changed from the previous capture 395 lines
edited: false body: Modern computers have multiple entropy sources that include variables from the physical world. Stealing the computer won't help an attacker + +comment: p1m951r +parent: t1_p1m2fm2 +author: slvbtc +created_utc: 1785836231 +edited: false +body: +AI will eventually leak all closed source code, if the only thing keeping a hardware wallet secure is closed source code then it will get hacked eventually. + +Having all code open source means security comes from competence not from hiding your code. + +Right now all HW wallets with open source code are getting reviewed and attacked and that process will end up in robust security, meanwhile ledger isnt getting reviewed or attacked so if there is a fault people wont know about it and will keep generating low entropy seeds until AI leaks their secure element code in the future and the seeds are all hacked then. + +If closed source code will eventually be leaked by AI anyway then its far better to be open source from the beginning. + +comment: p1m99ra +parent: t3_1vehzv8 +author: pcvcolin +created_utc: 1785836296 +edited: false +body: +Good post - but check out this security advisory here in full and don't forget to review the multi-sig notes at the end. https://wizardsardine.com/blog/coldcard-rng-vulnerability/ + +If there is one thing this should teach anyone it's that multi-device, multi-vendor multi-sig is needed in your setup as part of critical guard against things like this. + +comment: p1m9pa6 +parent: t3_1vehzv8 +author: TheDuhbb +created_utc: 1785836505 +edited: false +body: +fuck the randomness of hardware devices. +Just roll your dice and use physical real world entropy to generate your seed phrase. + +comment: p1m9sgl +parent: t1_p1ltmgl +author: pcvcolin +created_utc: 1785836549 +edited: false +body: +You hit the nail on the head. + +comment: p1m9u9z +parent: t1_p1m57to +author: pcvcolin +created_utc: 1785836574 +edited: false +body: +That's right. + +comment: p1ma634 +parent: t1_p1kh82v +author: TrueRead1435 +created_utc: 1785836734 +edited: false +body: +bitbox is definitely up there too. i gave trezor the edge because even if the device entropy completely failed, the host entropy is committed and verifiable. but i think both are excellent designs. + +comment: p1ma7x4 +parent: t1_p1m6uqs +author: TrueRead1435 +created_utc: 1785836757 +edited: false +body: +i wouldn't say it's unsafe. i'd say it's not independently verifiable. those are two different things. + +comment: p1ma9aw +parent: t1_p1kohml +author: TrueRead1435 +created_utc: 1785836776 +edited: false +body: +haven't looked at bitkey in enough detail yet. i'll probably add it in a future revision. + +comment: p1maabh +parent: t1_p1l9rh0 +author: TrueRead1435 +created_utc: 1785836790 +edited: false +body: +understandable... just don't let "for now" turn into "for the next 5 years" 😂 + +comment: p1mab4e +parent: t1_p1ldhio +author: TrueRead1435 +created_utc: 1785836800 +edited: false +body: +definitely one of the strongest designs i found. i was genuinely impressed while researching it. + +comment: p1mac52 +parent: t1_p1lb90a +author: TrueRead1435 +created_utc: 1785836813 +edited: false +body: +i actually agree with most of this. my point wasn't that ledger is insecure, only that users can't independently verify the entropy generation. that's a different trust model than wallets that combine multiple sources and publish how to verify them. + +comment: p1maeci +parent: t1_p1lrp2d +author: TrueRead1435 +created_utc: 1785836842 +edited: false +body: +good catch. i was specifically referring to the dice workflow, but you're right that seedsigner also supports camera entropy. i'll make that clearer. + +comment: p1mag92 +parent: t1_p1kb4ny +author: TrueRead1435 +created_utc: 1785836868 +edited: false +body: +thanks, that's a useful distinction. i was focusing on the default card-generated key flow, but i'll add that option if i update the comparison. + +comment: p1mah21 +parent: t1_p1lnnzk +author: TrueRead1435 +created_utc: 1785836878 +edited: false +body: +i skipped keepkey because it's much less common today, but it's a fair suggestion. i may include it in a future version. + +comment: p1majjt +parent: t1_p1lysw1 +author: TrueRead1435 +created_utc: 1785836910 +edited: false +body: +i don't see any reason to stop. just keep in mind it also offers camera entropy, the dice workflow was simply the one i was focusing on. + +comment: p1maojj +parent: t1_p1lu9vs +author: extraepicc +created_utc: 1785836976 +edited: false +body: +I mean do I need to keep the trezor and also the computer to be able to retrieve the bitcoin later? How about when I change computers? + +comment: p1mcihv +parent: t1_p1m8620 +author: sciencetaco +created_utc: 1785837845 +edited: false +body: +It doesn’t. But Coldcard’s entropy issue was a result of terrible engineering practices. + +comment: p1mcws9 +parent: t1_p1klmu6 +author: ThunderBurrn +created_utc: 1785838030 +edited: 1785838234 +body: +Only for long term HOLDERS using ledger... If folks generate 25th Passphrase via rolling dice and keep that completely safe and secure elsewhere, engraved in a steel plate, and totally stay disconnected off ledger live or any software app, basically use seed phrase as cold paper wallet and view btc holdings on sparrow wallet should probably be a good approach? + +comment: p1md6v4 +parent: t3_1vehzv8 +author: petitcurieux77 +created_utc: 1785838159 +edited: false +body: +As long as the seed phrase is encrypted by our password were are fine no, on Ledger for instance + +comment: p1mdom3 +parent: t1_p1mcihv +author: slvbtc +created_utc: 1785838378 +edited: false +body: +Are you saying you know without a doubt that ledger has perfect and infallible engineering practices? + +comment: p1me3z1 +parent: t1_p1l6urw +author: iLLuSion_xGen +created_utc: 1785838570 +edited: false +body: +This scares me and I think I’m switching to Trezor because of this + +comment: p1mgbyb +parent: t1_p1m3b5t +author: Btcyoda +created_utc: 1785839535 +edited: false +body: +Waiting for the next fuckups, making people say the same about wallet software, operating systems, moving to better jurisdictions, living lonely on Mars, etc..... + +comment: p1mhm5c +parent: t3_1vehzv8 +author: Xeruli +created_utc: 1785840083 +edited: false +body: +No Krux ? + +comment: p1mj9fa +parent: t1_p1maojj +author: masterof7 +created_utc: 1785840770 +edited: false +body: +Computer entropy is only used in the time of creating seedphrase (wallet). To retrieve it you need the seedphrase and passphrase (if you add this). After you create your wallet the computer is not important. + +comment: p1mjxtc +parent: t3_1vehzv8 +author: brdoc +created_utc: 1785841044 +edited: false +body: +Guys at this point f em all and just roll dices? + +comment: p1mk0fj +parent: t3_1vehzv8 +author: PDubsinTF-NEW +created_utc: 1785841073 +edited: false +body: +I hope that really smart crypto, security, quantum, and coding people can see this and weigh in. One can hope… + +comment: p1mmo0g +parent: t1_p1klmu6 +author: duper12677 +created_utc: 1785842134 +edited: false +body: +Would having the added pasephrase be enough to calm nerves with a ledger, or is it best to look for a replacement? + +comment: p1mqgtd +parent: t1_p1mmo0g +author: VulpesVulpe5 +created_utc: 1785843568 +edited: false +body: +Im running pretty low on trust this week so rather than trust ledger, it can be one part of a multisig + +comment: p1mqxx9 +parent: t1_p1l2hip +author: WoodpeckerCapital167 +created_utc: 1785843737 +edited: false +body: +This. + +Internal hacks, back doors and data breaching are all eventually an issue when $ is involved. + +Everything is hackable with enough power, time, money and luck + +comment: p1msdsk +parent: t1_p1m7kk5 +author: Objective-Run-9104 +created_utc: 1785844254 +edited: false +body: +To me this felt like either a trezor shill post or OP not doing the correct analysis. To be fair Trezor still has good security though, but saying it is better than bitbox02 is debatable. + +comment: p1mviqt +parent: t1_p1maeci +author: DavidssonA +created_utc: 1785845352 +edited: false +body: +Honest Question.... What would you have said about coldcard 3 months ago had you run this experiment? + +Because coldcard felt exactly like you all are pushing trezor... Its the best by far blah blah blah... + +I have a ledger, and a safepal. Both worked very well for years and years. At this point.... Bitkey or Trezor are sparking my curiosity but coldcard scares me away from change. + +comment: p1mvyqk +parent: t1_p1mcws9 +author: locustsandhoney +created_utc: 1785845500 +edited: false +body: +I would absolutely avoid using ledger live and add a passphrase. Also, build and run your own node so you’re not doxxing yourself to Ledger or any other company when you look up your own addresses. Using Ledger Live means Ledger can associate your IP addresses with all your wallet addresses and activity. True of any wallet software that doesn’t point to your own node. + +comment: p1mw7dr +parent: t3_1vehzv8 +author: RetroGaming4 +created_utc: 1785845581 +edited: false +body: +Only the paranoid will survive still rings true. + +comment: p1mxdxo +parent: t3_1vehzv8 +author: pwinne +created_utc: 1785845976 +edited: false +body: +So off the shelf Trezor is best? I’m confused by the roll your own dice thing + +comment: p1mxlj5 +parent: t1_p1ma7x4 +author: JTHM8008 +created_utc: 1785846045 +edited: false +body: +As they say, “Don’t Trust, Verify.” I ditched ledger after they came out with that backdoor BS… I moved to Trezor. + +I’m very sorry to hear about what happened and my heart goes out to anyone that lost BTC. I hope Coinkite gets sued to oblivion. + +comment: p1mxuop +parent: t3_1vehzv8 +author: 00-SilverShot +created_utc: 1785846129 +edited: false +body: +Thank you so much for taking the time to do this. + +So glad I switch from Ledger to Trezor a few years ago. That was an accidentally good move. Also, I checked the RNG on BlueWallet for my iPhone. They use the crypto-graphically secured RNG on your smartphone to generate the seed phrase. [https://x.com/bluewalletio/status/2083597423050461312](https://x.com/bluewalletio/status/2083597423050461312) + +In the year of our Lord 2026, Bluewallet on smartphone is proven to be much safer than Coldcard. I didn't have this on my 2026 bingo card. Regardless, I plan on making a new wallet and doing coin flips or dice rolls for manual entropy, just in case the RNG on iPhone or Android gets hacked. + +comment: p1mz2qc +parent: t1_p1klmu6 +author: MillerBlade2 +created_utc: 1785846528 +edited: false +body: +Time to move my shit coins off ledger + +comment: p1n2joh +parent: t3_1vehzv8 +author: Livid_Fox_1811 +created_utc: 1785847633 +edited: false +body: +Yes evaluating that the wallets have multiple sources of entropy is a strong starting point but you also rely on their code too. Trezor is open source which is a strong point but you’ll need to evaluate the code for every upgrade. The best strategy would be to roll a good pair of dice to create your own entropy or mix yours and theirs. + +comment: p1n92xm +parent: t1_p1m2o01 +author: seblz432 +created_utc: 1785849596 +edited: false +body: +You should look up the definition of open-source. It was source-available not open-source. + +The main difference is that no one is actually allowed to use the code in anything. If no one is using it/messing with it/developing on top of it/etc, issues are far less likely to be found. A lot of people consider being open-source incredibly important. + +comment: p1n9bhx +parent: t1_p1m5v7a +author: seblz432 +created_utc: 1785849665 +edited: false +body: +See my other comment: https://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/s/Ynud4sP8tp + +comment: p1n9qci +parent: t1_p1ltmgl +author: seblz432 +created_utc: 1785849784 +edited: false +body: +Imo the problem is simply that Coldcard isn't open-source, and I'm not sure why people trust a wallet from a small company without much resources to audit it when it's not open-source. + +At least Ledger basically has their own security firm. + +comment: p1n9yf3 +parent: t3_1vehzv8 +author: ChiefMetcalfe +created_utc: 1785849849 +edited: false +body: +Trezor gang rise up + +comment: p1nahe2 +parent: t3_1vehzv8 +author: Endlesslearner55 +created_utc: 1785850001 +edited: false +body: +How about hot wallets? + +comment: p1nao6g +parent: t1_p1mviqt +author: Thin_Needleworker795 +created_utc: 1785850055 +edited: false +body: +Avoid the companies in general. Consider building your own SeedSigner. + +comment: p1naxka +parent: t3_1vehzv8 +author: Enduringfate +created_utc: 1785850130 +edited: false +body: +Bitkey ? + +comment: p1nbgfs +parent: t1_p1mviqt +author: tradingunlimited +created_utc: 1785850281 +edited: 1785850711 +body: +This. The coldcard exploit wasn’t a hardware or engineering failure. I wouldn’t even call it a software bug. This was a problem with their build process. This is where the argument about open source vs. verifiable source falls down. Unless you were building for the same hardware and using the same build process, you would never find this bug. Therefore it very unlikely any open source implementation would have flagged this. This kind of problem is easy to miss and could very well be in any competing implementation. If I were on the engineering team, I would be a fruitcake about ensuring the RNG was running because it’s the one thing you can’t really unit test. My first thought would be to get rid of any software PRNGs to reduce the risk of them being used. After that, I would probably test on a board with the RNG chip removed to ensure its output is necessary and being used. I would test it many different ways because I have experienced similar surprises where I was confident something was solid when it reality it was subtly broken.Extracted text as captured
post: 1vehzv8 author: TrueRead1435 created_utc: 1785773802 title: I compared every major Bitcoin hardware wallet after the Coldcard entropy bug body: https://preview.redd.it/a38ylnfzp6hh1.png?width=1789&format=png&auto=webp&s=70406b55bd6c2049608753830456ebe98b45feae people who stored their btc on coldcard got drained because of entropy. the seed generation was reproducible, anyone could recompute their keys. so i went through every other hardware wallet to see how they make your seed, and whether the same thing can happen again. [u/Trezor](https://x.com/Trezor) : mixes the device's randomness with randomness from your computer, and the device has to prove it used both. even if its chip is fully broken, you're still fine. the best design here by far. [u/BitBoxSwiss](https://x.com/BitBoxSwiss) : 5 separate sources of randomness combined. one bad source can't sink you. open source, reproducible builds, dice supported. [u/FoundationHQ](https://x.com/FoundationHQ) : built their own randomness circuit out of plain resistors and capacitors, open source, on top of two other sources. no black-box chip to trust. supports dice. [u/KeystoneWallet](https://x.com/KeystoneWallet) : 2 secure chips from 2 different manufacturers, combined. also lets you roll 99 dice and publishes how to check the result yourself. [u/Blockstream](https://x.com/Blockstream) : jade pulls from 7 things: radio noise, cpu counters, battery, temperature, camera, your input, the app. very hard to break all of them. [u/SeedSigner](https://x.com/SeedSigner) : your dice are the only source. no chip to trust at all. and they ship a guide teaching you to verify their own math. weakest hardware, strongest proof. [u/OneKey](https://x.com/OneKey) : secure element plus mcu combined on device, open source firmware. solid, but you can't add your own randomness.Excerpt only. The complete copy is held offline and backs quotations on this site. The original publication remains the canonical public source.
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Recovered from the Internet Archive rather than captured by this project. The row records that third-party provenance separately from captures made by this project.
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post: 1vehzv8 author: TrueRead1435 created_utc: 1785773802 title: I compared every major Bitcoin hardware wallet after the Coldcard entropy bug body: https://preview.redd.it/a38ylnfzp6hh1.png?width=1789&format=png&auto=webp&s=70406b55bd6c2049608753830456ebe98b45feae people who stored their btc on coldcard got drained because of entropy. the seed generation was reproducible, anyone could recompute their keys. so i went through every other hardware wallet to see how they make your seed, and whether the same thing can happen again. [u/Trezor](https://x.com/Trezor) : mixes the device's randomness with randomness from your computer, and the device has to prove it used both. even if its chip is fully broken, you're still fine. the best design here by far. [u/BitBoxSwiss](https://x.com/BitBoxSwiss) : 5 separate sources of randomness combined. one bad source can't sink you. open source, reproducible builds, dice supported. [u/FoundationHQ](https://x.com/FoundationHQ) : built their own randomness circuit out of plain resistors and capacitors, open source, on top of two other sources. no black-box chip to trust. supports dice. [u/KeystoneWallet](https://x.com/KeystoneWallet) : 2 secure chips from 2 different manufacturers, combined. also lets you roll 99 dice and publishes how to check the result yourself. [u/Blockstream](https://x.com/Blockstream) : jade pulls from 7 things: radio noise, cpu counters, battery, temperature, camera, your input, the app. very hard to break all of them. [u/SeedSigner](https://x.com/SeedSigner) : your dice are the only source. no chip to trust at all. and they ship a guide teaching you to verify their own math. weakest hardware, strongest proof. [u/OneKey](https://x.com/OneKey) : secure element plus mcu combined on device, open source firmware. solid, but you can't add your own randomness.Excerpt only. The complete copy is held offline and backs quotations on this site. The original publication remains the canonical public source.
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